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. Introduction
The transcendent issue in American tort law has always been whether a
victim can recover from the injurer without a showing of fault on the part of the
injurer.1 More recently, however, the basic demarcation between those
categories of tort law in which fault is required for liability and those in which
it is not seems comparatively stable.2  Meanwhile, a second, even more
1. See Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REv. 235,
363 (1914) (predicting "that the incongruities" between the no fault principles of the workers'
compensation statutes and the predominantly fault requirements of the common law "will not be
permitted to continue permanently without protest"). Compare, e.g., OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 76 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1963) (1881) (arguing that the injurer should pay
for victim's loss only when at fault), and Richard A. Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 29, 32-34 (1972) (arguing for a fault requirement), with GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS]
(concluding that the fault system is a failure and should be replaced).
2. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 603 (1992) (concluding that since the early
1980s, the expansion of absolute liability, so prominent in American tort law between 1960 and
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fundamental aspect of traditional tort law is under assault, both within the realm
of theory and in the litigation system itself. With or without a requirement that
the plaintiff prove that the injurer acted with fault in order to recover, tort law
traditionally accepted the notion that a particular plaintiff must prove that a
particular defendant's acts caused the plaintiff's injuries.3 Yet during the past
quarter-century, this requirement has been challenged, particularly in mass
products torts4 and in environmental cases. 5 As early as 1987, legal
philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson observed, "Fault went fast... [n]ow cause
is going.",
6
Much has happened since then. The signature torts of our time are no
longer motor vehicle accidents in which an individual plaintiff sues an
individual defendant whose actions can be causally connected with a specific
victim's harm. Claims against manufacturers of tobacco products, handguns,
lead pigment, and many other mass products are generally brought on behalf of
1980, "has essentially ended").
3. See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 1, at 64 (noting that a defendant may be held liable "for
harm which he has done"); see also Claytor v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 662 A.2d 1374,
1382 (D.C. App. 1995) ("[A] defendant cannot be held liable unless the defendant has in fact
caused the plaintiffs harm."); Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 14 N.E.2d 828, 829 (N.Y.
1938) ("Where the facts proven show that there are several possible causes of an injury, for one
or more of which the defendant was not responsible.. . plaintiff cannot have a recovery.");
Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REv. 785, 811 (1990) ("[E]very tort system,
whether based on fault or strict liability, must determine whether aparticular defendant caused a
particular plaintiffs injury."); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114
HARv. L. REV. 966, 1101 (2001) ("There is a reluctance on fairness grounds to impose liability
when it cannot be proved that a particular injurer caused harm to a particular victim.").
4. See, e.g., Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1468 (10th Cir. 1988) (shifting
burden to defendant-manufacturers to prove absence of cause in fact); Sindell v. Abbott Labs.,
607 P.2d 924, 931 (Cal. 1980) (allowing plaintiff to recover on a market share liability basis
despite her inability to identify manufacturer of product that caused her harm); Thomas v.
Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 562 (Wis. 2005) (allowing victims of childhood lead poisoning to
recover against lead pigment manufacturers on a "risk contribution" basis); Laurens Walker &
John Monahan, Sampling Liability, 85 VA. L. REv. 329,337 (1999) (describing use of statistical
and sampling evidence in Minnesota's cases against tobacco manufacturers that enabled the
state to recover for medical expenses it had paid to residents with tobacco-related disease
without proof that any particular manufacturer's product caused any specific resident's disease).
5. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1051-52 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding defendant site owners liable for public nuisance even though they did not contribute to
the presence or cause of the release of hazardous substances on their property); Michie v. Great
Lakes Steel Div., 495 F.2d 213, 215-16 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding defendants jointly and
severally liable for harms caused by their pollutants despite inability of plaintiffs to identify
specific polluter "where said pollutants mix in the air so that their separate effects in creating the
individual injuries are impossible to analyze").
6. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Decline of Cause, 76 GEO. L. J. 137, 137 (1987).
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collective plaintiffs-usually either class action representatives or states or
municipalities seeking reimbursement of amounts paid to Medicaid recipients
as a result of the harms caused. In these actions and other cases against
manufacturers of mass products, the identity of the party that manufactured the
product that caused any individual victim's harm frequently is unknown.
Instead, plaintiffs seek to impose liability on defendant-manufacturers
collectively, through various legal theories including civil conspiracy or concert
of action, alternative liability, and market share liability.
Operating together, the collective plaintiff and the collective or
indeterminate defendant fundamentally challenge the traditional requirement of
individualized causation in tort law. No longer, at least in the important subset
of tort liability known as mass products torts, is tort law focused on the costs of
an accident, that is, seeking compensation for an individual victim from an
identified wrongdoer for harm caused during a discrete event. Today, tort
litigation is often explicitly intended as the chosen vehicle to address social
problems such as handgun violence, tobacco-related diseases, and childhood
lead poisoning. Control of the litigation in these high profile mass torts cases
has shifted from an individual wronged party and her counsel to lawyers
representing governmental or other collective entities suing in relation to harms
suffered by thousands or even hundreds of thousands of victims.7
The challenge to the traditional requirement of individual causation also
has been at the core of the revitalized debate among tort scholars during the
past generation as to what constitutes the fundamental essence of tort law. Two
very different conceptions of the theory of torts have emerged . Law and
7. See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv.
469,494,504-05 (1994) (describing how lawyers in mass products torts cases assume control of
litigation because of the inability of clients to do so). Judge Weinstein notes that in mass tort
cases:
[T]he lawyer acts on behalfofa group that cannot effectively control the lawyer's
conduct of the litigation. The lawyer often must form his or her own judgments
about what course of action is in the best interests of many clients as a group and,
perhaps more importantly, best reflects the needs and the unexpressed desires of
that group.
Id. at 504. The result, Judge Weinstein concludes, is that in many cases, "[tihe client becomes
no more than an unembodied cause of action." Id. at 494
8. For the purposes of analyzing the issue posed in this Article, whether a particular
victim should be required to prove that a particular injurer caused her harm in order to recover,
division of contemporary tort theories into two categories should suffice. In reality, any such
attempt to categorize tort theories is multifaceted and far more complex. Izhak Englard provides
a typology of tort theories that is both concise and more successful than most. IZHAK ENGLARD,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 1-83 (1993); see also infra note 39 and accompanying text
(describing England's typology).
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economics and other instrumental conceptions of tort law-most often
identified with the views of Guido Calabresi9 and Richard Posner,°--posit
that tort law pursues policy objectives derived from the needs of the society
external to the legal system, such as wealth maximization, accident
prevention, or the goal of distributing losses on a widespread basis.
Instrumental theorists typically do not believe that it is necessary for a
particular victim of harm to identify the particular injurer who caused her
specific harm in order to recover. William Landes and Richard Posner, who
share an instrumental conception of tort law, have virtually mocked any
requirement of individual causation: "[C]ausation in the law is an
inarticulate groping for economically sound solutions .... " "l In short,
those with an instrumental conception of tort law generally view any
requirement of particularity in causation as "old fashioned" and likely to
impede their goals.
The instrumental assault on traditional tort law causation principles,
however, has provoked a strong response from those scholars who view the
tort system as pursuing corrective justice; that is, as a means of requiring
the injuring party to repair the losses caused by his or her wrongful
conduct. Ernest Weinrib and other corrective justice scholars argue that
intrinsic to the entire notion of tort liability is the idea that a particular
victim must prove that his harm was caused by a particular injurer.'
2
This Article begins, in Part II, with a brief summary of the debate
between the proponents of the instrumental and the proponents of the
corrective justice theories of tort. This debate addresses such overarching
issues as the goals of tort law and the justification for tort liability. Perhaps
more than on any other concrete issue, however, the proponents of the two
approaches divide on the question whether a particular victim must prove
that a particular injurer caused her injury as a prerequisite for recovery.
During the same decades that this debate over the grand theory of tort
law has raged, courts have encountered mass products torts cases in which
the existence of a continuing requirement of individual causation, if left
intact, would prove decisive in denying liability for the victims' losses.
The attack upon the particular victim/particular injurer paradigm of tort
9. E.g., THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1; Guido Calabresi & John T. Hirschoff,
Toward a Testfor Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
10. E.g., RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (6th ed. 2003); Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, supra note 1, at 32-34.
11. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic
Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 131 (1983).
12. See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRivATE LAW (1995).
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liability first reached a critical threshold in the 1970s and the 1980s when
victims of asbestos-related diseases joined in class actions 13 and
consolidated cases 14 to sue asbestos products manufacturers and often were
unable to identify the specific manufacturers whose products caused their
illnesses.15 Similarly, the individual causation requirement also posed an
insurmountable barrier to lead-poisoned children' 6 and Vietnam veterans
suffering from diseases caused by the defoliant Agent Orange 7 and seeking
compensation from product manufacturers.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 18 probably the classic causation case of
that era, was the unusual exception in which plaintiffs recovered. The facts
in Sindell illustrate the causation problem faced by victims of mass
products torts. The plaintiff sued on behalf of herself and other similarly
situated women suffering from cancerous and pre-cancerous growths that
allegedly resulted from their mothers' consumption, at least ten or twelve
years earlier, of diethylstilbestrol (DES), a synthetic compound of estrogen
13. See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649,650-51 (E.D. Tex. 1990)
(laying forth the class action claim), rev'd inpart, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998); see also infra
notes 86-102 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Parker's approach in Cimino).
14. See, e.g., In re E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (E.D. & S.D.
N.Y. 1991), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part on other grounds sub nom. In re Brooklyn Navy Yard
Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing the propriety of consolidation).
15. See, e.g., Bateman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1132, 1133 (5th Cir.
1986) (barring recovery in asbestos case where plaintiffs were unable to identify either the
specific products causing their diseases or any of the manufacturers of the products); Goldman
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691, 702 (Ohio 1987) (same).
16. See, e.g., Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 690 A.2d 169, 175 (Pa. 1997)
(affirming dismissal of claims where plaintiff suffering from childhood lead poisoning could not
identify specific manufacturers of lead pigment contained in paint that had been applied at
various times during a period lasting more than a century to interior walls of house where
plaintiff lived). But see Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 532-533 (Wis. 2005) (allowing
victims of childhood lead poisoning to recover against lead pigment manufacturers on a "risk
contribution" basis without proof of causal connection between a particular victim and a specific
manufacturer). In 2001, I consulted briefly with Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky of
Washington, D.C., which represents E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., on several legal issues in
the litigation brought by the state of Rhode Island against lead pigment manufacturers. As the
former Chair of the Maryland Lead Paint Poisoning Commission, I also have served as a
consultant and an advisor to the National Paint and Coatings Association on state legislative
responses to reduce and eliminate childhood lead poisoning. Obviously, the views expressed in
this Article are strictly my own.
17. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1263
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that plaintiffs who opted-out of class action settlement were unable to
prove that their diseases resulted from exposure to Agent Orange or that "any particular
defendant produced the Agent Orange to which he may have been exposed").
18. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
MASS PRODUCTS TORTS
intended to prevent miscarriages in pregnant women.' 9 She lacked the
means to identify which pharmaceutical company manufactured the DES
consumed by her mother because the eleven drug companies named in the
complaint and scores of additional drug companies used an identical
chemical formula for the drug, which was approved by the federal Food and
Drug Administration. The plaintiff admitted that she could not identify
which company had manufactured the drug responsible for her injury, and
accordingly, the trial court dismissed the complaint. 20  The California
Supreme Court, however, reversed the case on appeal and introduced the
concept of market share liability, a form of causation that dispensed with the
individual causation requirement.2'
Part III analyzes how victims of latent diseases caused by exposure to
mass products and the victims' attorneys, during the 1980s, tried to combine
procedural devices such as class actions and consolidations-that in effect
created "collective plaintiffs"-with new "collective defendant" theories of
causation. These theories, such as market share liability and alternative
liability, would enable courts to hold multiple and indeterminate manufacturers
of products liable without proof of individual causation. By the late 1980s,
with rare exceptions, it was clear that these challenges to the principle of
individual causation were unsuccessful. For the most part, the tort system had
rejected this first wave of the instrumentalist challenge to the traditional
requirement of individual causation.
The problems caused by the inability of victims of latent diseases and their
attorneys to prove individual causation have not disappeared, however. A
"second wave" of challenges to the individual causation requirement was
launched during the mid- 1 990s when state governments sued tobacco
manufacturers to "recoup" the financial losses they had experienced as a result of
tobacco-related illnesses, consisting largely of medical assistance (Medicaid)
payments to victims of such diseases. The new form of the "collective plaintiff'
in the late 1990s and early years of the twenty-first century was the state,22
19. See id. at 925-26 (setting forth the complaint).
20. See id. at 934 (stating that the trial court sustained the defendants' demurrers).
21. See id. at 937-38 (stating that "[u]nder this approach, each manufacturer's liability
would approximate its responsibilities for the injuries caused by its own products").
22. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., No. 99-526, 2001 R.I. Super LEXIS 37, at
*1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2001) (allowing state's claims against manufacturers of lead pigment
for reimbursement of expenses resulting from childhood lead poisoning); Complaint, Moore ex
rel. State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct. Jackson County, filed May 23, 1994)
(filing the first of state recoupment actions against the tobacco companies), available at
Tobacco Litigation Documents, Website of the Galen Digital Library of University of
California, San Francisco, www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation [hereinafter Tobacco
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municipality,2 3 health insurer,24 union health and welfare fund,
25 or hospital26
suing to recover the collective entity's financial losses resulting from harms
experienced by individual victims, such as those resulting from tobacco-related
illnesses, handgun violence, and childhood lead poisoning. When the states,
municipalities, and other organizational litigants tried to overcome causation
requirements using those substantive law approaches that generally had been
rejected by the courts during the 1980s, such as market share liability, they
were usually-as would be expected-unsuccessful.27 The states and other
new collective plaintiffs, however, arguably have experienced somewhat
greater success in using substantive tort claims, such as fraud and public
nuisance, in new and novel ways that enable them to recover their financial
losses without proving an individual causation link between any particular
manufacturer and any specific victim.
Today the fate of the individual causation requirement in mass products
tort law hangs in the balance. It is difficult to predict whether the second wave
challenges to the individual causation requirement that are inherent in the state
and municipal recoupment actions will be any more successful in overturning
the particular injurer/particular victim causation paradigm than were the class
actions and consolidated mass torts claims of the 1980s. 28 What is clear,
however, is that these novel forms of tort litigation provide an unusual testing
Litigation Documents] (last visited June 17, 2005).
23. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1140 (Ohio
2002) (allowing claims of municipality against gun manufacturers for reimbursement for
expenses such as increased police, emergency, health, and corrections costs).
24. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 345,
352 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (claiming recovery from tobacco product manufacturers based on
misrepresentation and RICO theories).
25. See, e.g., Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 23 F.
Supp. 2d 771, 777 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (seeking recovery against tobacco manufacturers as a
result of costs incurred by plaintiff health trusts for treatment of smoking-related illnesses and
addiction).
26. See, e.g., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 432 (3d Cir.
2000) (claiming recovery from tobacco companies for unreimbursed costs of health care
provided to nonpaying patients suffering from tobacco-related disease).
27. See, e.g., Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1254
(Fla. 1996) (holding unconstitutional on state due process grounds a statute enabling the state to
recover Medicaid costs resulting from tobacco-related illnesses from manufacturers on a market
share liability basis).
28. Also, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently resurrected a theory of collective
causation known as "risk contribution," similar to market share liability, in a case brought by
childhood lead poisoning victims against pigment manufacturers. See Thomas v. Mallett, 701
N.W.2d 523, 532-33 (Wis. 2005) (allowing victims of childhood lead poisoning to recover
against lead pigment manufacturers on a "risk contribution" basis).
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ground for the most fundamental theories of the nature of tort liability, as well
as having important "real world" consequences for the economic and social
problems resulting from tobacco-related illnesses, handgun violence, and
childhood lead poisoning.
11. The Instrumentalist Challenge to a Requirement of Individual Causation
and the Corrective Justice Response
Judges and scholars alike regard as axiomatic the requirement that the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant caused plaintiff's harm in order to
establish liability. William Prosser described it as "the simplest and most
obvious" aspect of determining tort liability.29  In Payton v. Abbott
Laboratories,30 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted that
"identification of the party responsible for causing injury to another is a
longstanding prerequisite" for liability.31 The court reasoned that the requirement
"separates wrongdoers from innocent actors, and also ensures that wrongdoers are
held liable only for the harm that they have caused.
3 2
Some of the most influential architects of tort theory during the past
generation, however, have rejected the individual causation requirement in
torts. In 1975, then Yale Professor-and current Second Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge--Guido Calabresi argued that the requirement that a particular
plaintiff prove that a particular defendant caused its harm was "far from being
the essential, almost categorical imperative it is sometimes described to be."
33
In the decades that followed Calabresi's provocative challenge, the requirement
of individual causation became, and remains, a principal focus of disagreement
between those scholars such as Calabresi and Judge Richard Posner, who
espouse instrumental perspectives on torts, most notably law and economics,
and other scholars, such as Ernest Weinrib, who conceptualize tort liability in
terms of corrective justice.34 Instrumentalists believe that the goal of tort law is
29. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 237 (4th ed. 1971); see
also FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OScAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.2
(1986) ("Through all the diverse theories of proximate cause runs a common thread; almost all
agree that defendant's wrongful conduct must be a cause in fact of plaintiff's injury before there
is liability.").
30. Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
31. Id. at 188.
32. Id.
33. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven. Jr., 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 69,85 (1975).
34. See infra notes 49-77 and accompanying text (discussing the corrective justice
62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873 (2005)
to pursue policy objectives that themselves are derived from the needs of the
society external to the legal system, such as accident prevention,35 wealth
maximization, 36 and the widespread distribution of the economic losses
resulting from accidents.37 In contrast, corrective justice theorists believe that
the essence of tort law is the objective that an injuring party should repair the
losses caused by his or her wrongful conduct.38 Though Izhak Englard, in his
superb typology of contemporary tort theory, convincingly argues that any
attempt to divide tort theorists into two camps is over-simplified,39 the
dichotomy works here for purposes of exploring the views of scholars on the
specific issue of whether a particular victim must prove that a particular injurer
caused her harm in order to hold the injurer liable. Those with an instrumental
conception of tort typically believe that it is not necessary for a particular victim
to identify the particular injurer who caused his harm. On the other hand,
approach). Corrective justice and law and economics have been described as "the two most
powerful theories of tort in American legal thought today." Christopher H. Schroeder,
Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REv. 439, 439 (1990). But
see infra note 39 (describing view of lzhak Englard that any attempt to dichotomize tort theories
is oversimplified).
35. See THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 26-27 (stating that "the principal
function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding
accidents").
36. See generally POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, supra note 10; Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, supra note 1.
37. See THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note ], at 27-28 (describing the importance of
spreading accident losses and shifting them to "deep pockets" as means of reducing "the real
societal costs of accidents").
38. See generally JULESL. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS(1992); WENRIB, supra note 12.
39. See ENGLARD, supra note 8, at 1-83. Englard concludes, for example, that moral
responsibility and social utility are not "an antinomy" and that "only a very specific philosophy,
especially one which grounds itself on Kantian notions, will create an irreducible opposition
between these two concepts." Id. For example, according to Englard, Posner's "starting point is
the comprehensive positive economic principle of wealth maximization" (certainly a utilitarian
or instrumental approach), but Posner also regards the imposition of liability on the defendant as
"a moral responsibility." Id. Englard further notes that some scholars, notably critical theorist
Richard Abel, strongly emphasize "distributive justice," in contrast to "corrective justice" in the
Aristotelian dichotomy. Id. at 66-67. Fundamentally, Englard concludes, "The rhetoric of
actual tort law is pluralistic: law-givers and courts rely on a multitude of contrasting reasons in
imposing liability." Id. at 64. He ultimately acknowledges, however, that "[t]he two extreme,
opposite, univalent theories of tort liability are the utilitarian, economic theory of Posner and the
non-instrumentalist, corrective justice theory of Weinrib." Id. at 31. According to Englard,
Calabresi, while "postulat[ing] economic efficiency as the overriding rational principle of
tortious liability, affords" a place "in principle, to considerations ofjustice." Id.; see also Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089,1102 (1972) (illustrating "otherjustice reasons").
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corrective justice theorists begin with a notion that a tort is a harm caused by a
particular injurer to a particular victim.
A. The Instrumentalist Conception of Tort Liability and the Requirement of
Individual Causation
Among those with an instrumental conception of torts, Calabresi most
specifically has argued that a particular victim need not identify a particular
injurer in order to recover. The origins of Calabresi's conception of tort law lie
both in the field of welfare economics 40 and in the reformist zeal of the Great
Society of the 1960s.41 For Calabresi, the goal of tort law is to reduce "the
costs of accidents," an economic and social problem like any other economic
and social problem. To achieve this goal, Calabresi identifies several
"subgoals" for the tort system. First, he argues that any accident compensation
system should "discourage activities that are 'accident prone' and substitute
safer activities as well as safer ways of engaging in the same activities.
"42
Calabresi's second objective is to distribute the costs of accidents in a manner
that inflicts "less pain" than if the accident costs were borne solely by the
original victims. 43 The most important way of accomplishing this objective is
to distribute the losses resulting from an accident broadly across many people.
Calabresi also argues in favor of the "deep pocket" notion: that the costs of
accidents will cause less pain and disutility if paid for by people who will suffer
less "social and economic dislocation as a result of bearing them, usually
thought to be the wealthy."44
Calabresi thus focuses on objectives related to the victim (loss distribution
or compensation) and to the injurer (loss avoidance or deterrence) that are not
necessarily intrinsically linked. The need to impose liability on the injurer in
order to discourage her harm-producing activity does not require that the
financial penalty extracted from the injurer be transferred to the particular
40. See Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1413, 1416-17 (2001) (crediting Calabresi with the "most sophisticated
applied treatment to the law" of the welfare economics ofPigou); see generally A.C. PiGou, THE
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).
41. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64
MD. L. REv. 364, 370 (2005) (outlining Calabresi's argument).
42. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 68.
43. See id. at 27-28 (setting forth the second subgoal). The aim of Calabresi's third
subgoal of "tertiary cost reduction" is to reduce the costs of achieving the other two goals,
primary and secondary cost avoidance. See id. at 28 (briefly explaining the third subgoal).
44. Id. at40.
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injurer's victim. Conversely, any particular victim can receive her
compensation from any party capable of distributing her accident losses as
broadly as possible; loss distribution does not require that her losses be paid by
the injuring party. Calabresi clearly accepts the notion that liability can be
assessed on injurers on a collective, as opposed to a particularized, basis:
For centuries society has seemed to accept the notion that justice required a
one-to-one relationship between the party that injures and the party that is
injured .... There is, of course, no logical necessity for linking our
treatment of victims, individually or as a group, to our treatment of injurers,
individually or as a group.45
Viewed from the perspective of the loss avoidance goal, according to
Calabresi, the traditional "but for" requirement of causation between a
particular injurer's acts and a particular victim's harm,
[F]ar from being the essential, almost categorical imperative it is sometimes
described to be, is simply a useful way of toting up some of the costs the
[potential injurer] should face in deciding whether avoidance is worthwhile.
One could do away with the but for test and employ other methods to
achieve the same end. For example, one could simply guess at the size of
the injury costs that will be associated in the future with behavior causally
linked to such injury costs.
46
By recognizing the possibility of nontraditional mechanisms for loss
minimization and for loss distribution, Calabresi severs the linkage between
deterrence and compensation that has been regarded as inherent in traditional
tort law. Further, he notes that the amount that should be paid by the injurer to
discourage harm-producing activity need not be equivalent to the amount
needed to compensate the injured party.
4 7
Nor is Calabresi alone, among the instrumentalists, in rejecting the
traditional requirement that a particular victim be required to prove that her
harm was caused by a particular victim in order to recover. Posner, for
example, who subscribes to a much different version of law and economics,
4 8
45. Id. at 297.
46. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., supra note 33, at 85 (emphasis in original).
47. See THE COSTS OF AccIDENTs, supra note 1, at 302-03 (arguing that the amount of an
injurer's payment should depend on its comparative level of fault compared with that of the
other injurers).
48. See Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents: A Reassessment,
64 MD. L. REv. 12, 12 (2005) ("[D]escribing deep differences.., between us... concerning
the proper way to apply economics to torts."); see also ENGLARD, supra note 8, at 31-42
(comparing Calabresi's and Posner's views of tort liability); Keith N. Hylton, Calabresi andthe
Intellectual History ofLaw and Economics, 64 MD. L. REv. 85,90 (2005) (contrasting views of
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agrees. He concludes that manufacturers that may have produced the product
responsible for the harm of any particular victim, even when the particular
manufacturer who produced the particular product causing the victim's harm
cannot be identified, should be held jointly and severally liable without a right
of contribution against other manufacturers because "joint liability under a
negligence standard creates incentives for both potential injurers to take due
care."
,49
B. The Corrective Justice Response
1. Weinrib and the Strong Version of the Individual Causation Requirement
In contrast to the instrumental conception, Ernest Weinrib's corrective
justice perspective regards "the basic feature of private law" to be that "a
particular plaintiff sues a particular defendant."50 Liability "requires that the
plaintiff have a right and that the defendant act in breach of a duty."5 1 Tort law
is not a matter of promoting welfare; it instead is a matter ofprotecting rights as
conceived by Aristotle and Kant.52 Torts cannot be understood in terms of
instrumental objectives.53  Both the original wrong and "the transfer of
resources that undoes it," according to Weinrib, constitute "a single nexus of
activity and passivity where actor and victim are defined in relation to each
other."
,54
Weinrib finds that the idea that one party's injury at the hand of the other
should be rectified by enforcing the victim's claim against the injurer was
Calabresi and Posner).
49. Landes & Posner, supra note 11, at 124-25; see also William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517,540-
41 (1980) (defendingjoint liability in actions against manufacturers of fungible products "on the
ground that it will induce better record keeping and thus reduce the future incidence of cases
where the costs of information result in treating an individual tort as a joint tort").
50. Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REv. 403, 409 (1992) (emphasis
added); see also WEINRIB, supra note 12, at 1, 142-44 ("The most striking feature of private law
is that it directly connects two particular parties through the phenomenon of liability.").
51. WEINRB, supra note 12, at 125.
52. See id. at 56, 57, 84, 131 (describing Aristotle's and Kant's views on corrective
justice).
53. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 407,415
(1987) (presenting an implication of"causation construed as the particularization of the sufferer
in relation to the actor").
54. WEINRIB, supra note 12, at 56.
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recognized even before Aristotle.55 Aristotle identified justice with equality,
and injustice with transactions creating excesses or shortfalls. 56 To Aristotle,
however, equality certainly did not mean an equal distribution of resources, nor
did he define or describe the meaning of equality except in formal or
mathematical terms. To provide substantive definition to Aristotle's formal
notion of equality, Weinrib turns to Immanuel Kant. Weinrib reads Kant to
conclude that individuals, as "self determining agents... are duty-bound to
interact with each other on terms appropriate to their equal status." 
57
Individuals must "treat the other's personal... embodiment[] in a manner that
does not violate their formal equality as free wills."
58
Weinrib derives his theory of corrective justice from his reading of
Aristotle and of Kant. Once the injurer has caused unjust harm to the victim,
the injurer must compensate the victim in order to restore him to the pre-
existing state. 59 The injurer has realized a corresponding gain in normative, but
usually not factual, terms; her gain is a gain in comparison to what she is due or
entitled. Under this view, "because the plaintiff has lost what the defendant
has gained, a single liability links the particular person who gained to the
particular person who lost." Unlike the instrumental conception of torts that
makes it possible to separate the victim's need for compensation from the
desire to discourage harm-producing activity by the defendant, these "mutually
independent changes in the parties' holdings" cannot "be restored by tworodeend t • ,,62
independent operations. The correlative relationship between the victim and
55. See id. (observing, however, that "Aristotle ... was the first to point to the distinctive
features of this process"). See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETmICS 120-23 (Martin Ostwald
trans., 1962) ("When one man has inflicted and another received a wound.., the doing and
suffering are unequally divided; by inflicting a loss on the offender, the judge tries to take away
his gain and restore the equilibrium.").
56. See WEINRIB, supra note 12, at 60-61 (describing Aristotle's idea ofjustice); see also
ARISTOTLE, supra note 55, at 118-20 ("Since an unjust man and an unjust act are unfair or
unequal, it is obvious that there exists also-a median term between the two extremes of
inequality. This is the fair or equal ... [n]ow the just in transactions is also something equal
(and the unjust something unequal), but (it is something equal) which corresponds not to a
geometrical but to an arithmetical proportion.").
57. See WEINRIB, supra note 12, at 61 (stating that "Aristotle is not committed ... to any
particular criterion of equality"); see also IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 42,
56,214,230 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (discussing the nature of the individual).
58. WEINRLB,supra note 12, at 104.
59. See id. at 114-36, 142-44 (discussing correlativity).
60. See id. at 115-20 (proposing "a distinction between.., the 'factual' and the
'normative' aspects of gains and losses").
61. Id. at 63.
62. See id. (explaining the bipolarity of corrective justice).
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the injurer, argues Weinrib, "locks the plaintiff and the defendant into a
reciprocal normative embrace, in which factors such as deterrence and
compensation, whose justificatory force applies solely to one of the parties, play
no role."'63 The court's role can only be understood as that of applying liability
in the case of a bipolar relationship.6
2. Corrective Justice Without a Requirement of Individual Causation
Not all theorists typically associated with corrective justice perspectives
necessarily share Weinrib's view that the law should require that a particular
victim must prove that his harm was caused by a particular injurer in order to
recover. Jules Coleman, for example, expounds a corrective justice explanation
for tort law that is distinct from that of Weinrib.65 He argues that though tort
law serves both moral and instrumental goals, its core "implements corrective
justice., 66 Corrective justice requires wrongdoers, according to Coleman, "to
repair the wrongful losses for which they are responsible., 67 He claims that his
description of the wrongful losses for which the injurer should be held liable,
unlike Weinrib's, is derived from existing social practice and not from abstract
principles.68 Wrongdoing, in Coleman's analysis, is defined not by reference to
Aristotle or to Kant, but by the violation of an appropriate social norm or
convention. 69 Tort liability, by strengthening and enforcing these legitimate
expectations, enhances the liberal conception of society by providing the
stability that individuals require in order to effectively promote their own
welfare. At the same time, recovery in tort addresses the victim's need for
compensation created by the wrongful loss.
Coleman's version of corrective justice, not surprisingly, leads him to the
conclusion that "the goals of tort law are pursued only within a structure of
case-by-case adjudication between individual victims and their respective
63. Id. at 142.
64. See id. at 144 (defining the court's task).
65. See generally COLEMAN, supra note 38, at 197-431.
66. See id. at 428 (cautioning, however, "that it is a mistake to hold that tort law as a
whole is a matter of corrective justice"); see also id. at 303 (expressing the view "that accident
law implements a variety of different principals and policies").
67. Id. at 324; see generally id. at 323-26.
68. See id. at 433 (stating that his "approach could not be more different" than the
approach of Ernest Weinrib).
69. See id. at 358-60 (asserting that local norms are critical to the idea of wrongdoing in
corrective justice theory).
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injurers.'7 The injurer is liable for the victim's harm because she "is
responsible in a way which others are not.",7 1  In short, tort liability
implementing corrective justice principles is created by the relationship of the
victim and the injurer and that relationship sets the parameters for who should
satisfy the obligation to repair the wrongful loss.
Coleman rejects other writers who argue that imposing collective liability
on indeterminate defendants can be reconciled with corrective justice
principles. These writers suggest that an injurer can be held liable anytime it
imposes a risk on a victim, even if it cannot be determined which injurer's risk
in fact resulted in the victim's harm. Richard Wright, for example, when faced
72with a case such as Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, argues:
[I]f each defendant is held liable only for her share of the risk exposure,
there is no conflict with the corrective-justice view. It still must be proven
that each defendant caused the risk exposure that possibly led to the
manifested injury, and liability is for such risk exposure, rather than the
manifested injury.73
Coleman explicitly rejects the attempt of Wright and other scholars to
reconcile corrective justice principles with market share liability and other
impositions of liability when particularity of causation cannot be proved.74 He
claims that Wright is being inconsistent when he argues that the creation of
unjustifiable risk is the relevant harm in Sindell and similar cases, but that
elsewhere in tort law liability results only from the harm itself.75 Coleman
nevertheless sanctions liability without proof of individual causation, even
when such liability is imposed within the tort system, as something separate and
70. Id. at 374.
71. Id. at 355.
72. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
73. Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics,
and Proof" Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IowAL. REv. 1001, 1073
(1988); see also Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk A Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 963,967-90 (2003)
(arguing that victim should be able to recover for being exposed to the risk of harm, even if she
cannot prove that the acts of any particular wrongdoer resulted in her harm); Glen 0. Robinson,
Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713,739 (1982)
(justifying market share liability on the basis that fairness requires only that the particular
defendant held liable be one that created a risk of injury to the particular plaintiff, not the injury
itself); Thomson, supra note 6, at 137-38 (sanctioning the use of probabilistic evidence to hold
manufacturers of mass products liable without proof of individual causation). The "risk
contribution" arguments of Wright, Finkelstein, and Robinson appeared to have prevailed in the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's recent opinion in Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 532-33
(Wis. 2005) (allowing recovery on a "risk contribution" basis).
74. See COLEMAN, supra note 38, at 399-400, 405-06 (faulting Wright's argument).
75. See id. (same).
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apart from the basic corrective justice principles of tortious liability. Instead,
Coleman supports it as a form of social insurance or an alternative
compensation system in which manufacturers who have imposed the risk are
assessed for the damages.76
Coleman's endorsement of liability without proof of individual causation,
though seemingly inconsistent with his core collective justice principles, is
consistent with his recognition that the tort system pursues multiple goals:
I am unwilling to treat departures from corrective justice in tort law as
mistakes in need of reform. Instead, other parts of tort law may reflect
alternative approaches to allocating losses ... in ways that sever the
relationship between agent and loss under corrective justice.77
Attempts of corrective justice proponents to justify the imposition of
liability on manufacturers of fungible mass products even when a victim cannot
prove which manufacturer caused her harm seem logically strained. Claire
Finkelstein, for example, has catalogued a group of disparate cases, including
those involving both market share liability and recoveryfor loss of chance in
the medical malpractice context, that she claims establish the beginning of a
trend within tort law recognizing liability for risk creation.78 It clearly remains
the case, however, that the tort system generally does not allow a victim to
recover from a defendant merely because she was exposed to harm resulting
from defendant's risk creation. 79 As yet, for example, the tort system is a long
76. See id. at 405 (discussing the DES cases). Coleman acknowledges that in the case of
mass products cases involving indeterminate defendants, he believes that the tort system should
focus on goals other than corrective justice:
My suggestion is that we read the DES cases not as an effort to implement
corrective justice in an imperfect world but as an effort to implement localized or
constrained at-fault pools to deal with injuries caused by certain kinds of defective
products.... (The tort suit is used as a forum for implementing this plan simply
because it uses the plaintiff class as private prosecutors and is presumably desirable
on those grounds.)
Id.
77. Id. at 434.
78. See Finkelstein, supra note 73, at 980-81 (presenting the "Risk Harm Thesis"); see
also Judith Jarvis Thomson, Remarks on Causation and Liability, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 101,
101 (1984) (noting that some recent cases have allowed recovery without causation). Thomson
believes that potential injurers, such as manufacturers of mass products, can be held liable on
legal grounds that do not require the particular victim to identify the particular injurer
responsible for her harm when the potential injurers not only "act equally negligently" but also
"impose[] roughly the same risk of harm on one and the same person." Id. at 149.
79. See, e.g., Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 428-44 (1997)
(holding that a railroad worker negligently exposed to asbestos, but without any symptoms of
any disease, cannot recover under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) for negligently
inflicted emotional distress or for future medical costs until he manifests symptoms of a
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way from allowing the victim of an unidentified, intoxicated hit-and-rum driver, or
even any driver on the highway late Saturday night that may not have been involved
in a two-car collision but still would have been exposed to the risk created by
intoxicated drivers, to recover from all Saturday-night drivers who are subsequently
found guilty of driving while intoxicated.
Corrective justice principles appear to leave victims of diseases resulting from
exposure to harmful products without a remedy within the tort system Coleman
recognizes that liability based upon mere risk creation is inconsistent with corrective
justice principles. His own valiant effort to find a way around this conclusion in the
cases involving latent diseases resulting from exposure to mass products torts, which
clearly troubles him, requires Coleman to graft principles of social insurance or
alternative compensation systems onto the tort system in seeming contravention of
corrective justice principles.
I1. The First Wave ofAttempts to Collectivize Causation in Tort Law
By the 1970s, the scientific, cultural, and legal predicates for challenging the
traditional requirement of proof of individual causation in tort law were in place.
Having conquered polio and other devastating infectious diseases, the focus of
public health efforts increasingly shifted to diseases caused by exposure to toxic
substances, either in the environment or contained in products.80 For the first time,
the public understood the devastating diseases caused by exposure to asbestos
dust,8' the strong causal link between lung cancer and smoking, 2 the effects of
disease). But see Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 532-33 (Wis. 2005) (allowing recovery
on a risk-contribution basis without proof of individual causation).
80. The environmental movement had its roots in the nineteenth century recognition of
the link between sanitation and the "germs" that caused infectious illness. See CHRISTOPHER
WARREN, BRUSH WITH DEATH: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF LEAD POISONING 39-41 (2000) (stating
that the "reduction in the epidemiological background noise, together with the establishment of
an interventionist pediatric industry" resulted in "an increased awareness of environmental
poisons in general and of lead in particular"); Anjali Garg & Philip J. Landriagan, Social Policy
and Social Movements: Children's Environmental Health: New Gains in Science and Policy,
584 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 135, 137 (2002) (discussing human health and the
environment). As the incidence of infectious diseases began to decline, the focus on the
environment also diminished. Then, in 1962, the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring
focused the public's attention on the deleterious health consequences of toxins present in the
environment. See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); Garg & Landriagan,
supra, at 136-38.
81. See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL
10-14 (1985) (describing studies released in 1964 showing a dramatic increase in mortality and
morbidity among those exposed to asbestos).
82. See DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A
DEADLY INDUSTRY 198 (2001) (discussing the public awareness of the link between cigarette
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low doses of lead on children in terms of loss of intelligence,83 and other links
between product exposure and detrimental health consequences.
At the same time, changes in the law-particularly the adoption of strict
products liability--overcame many of the legal barriers faced by victims and their
lawyers seeking compensation from manufacturers of harmful products. Yet in
cases of latent illnesses and similar harms in which the specific manufacturer of
the fungible or nearly fungible product that caused the specific victim's harm
could not be identified, the traditional requirement of individual causation in torts
remained an obstacle.
This Part describes and analyzes the procedural mechanisms and the
substantive theories of causation, in cases involving multiple and indeterminate
defendants, that victims' attorneys and the courts pioneered in the 1980s to
overcome this obstacle. These novel approaches sought to transform the tort
action from an "individual against individual" contest concerning a specific,
isolated tortious act and the resulting particular harm to a very different system for
handling accidental harms. That system, as envisioned by Calabresi and other
instrumentalists, viewed the liability issue as a matter to be decided between the
collective plaintiff and the collective defendant. I begin with a brief analysis of
the forms that the "collective plaintiff' has assumed in recent mass product tort
smoking and cancer). On December 8, 1953, a series of medical presentations linked smoking
to cancer and thus the dangers of cigarettes first came to widespread public attention. Id. "At
the time, a link between smoking and cancer had not been acknowledged by the National Cancer
Institute, the U.S. Public Health Service, or many distinguished members of the medical and
scientific communities." Id.; see also Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco
Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 856 (1992) (describing the "great cancer scare" of the
1950s).
83. See WARREN, supra note 80, at 14 (noting the lack of knowledge about lead
poisoning). According to Warren, "At the beginning of the twentieth century, the relative lack
of diagnostic tools meant that only acute, clinical plumbism was accurately diagnosed." Id.
Public health researchers only "became aware of the true scale of childhood lead poisoning in
the late 1960s." Id. at 28. Warren continues, "as late as the early 1950s, Baltimore's aggressive
pediatric lead screening program defined cases in which the blood-lead level exceeded 70 tg/dL
only as 'possible lead poisoning."' Id. Today, the Center for Disease Control states, "Many
studies point to a link between BLLs [blood lead levels] > 10 gig/dL and harmful health effects,
in particular learning disabilities and behavior problems." CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. HEALTH, CHILDREN'S BLOOD LEAD LEVELS IN THE UNITED
STATES, PREVENTING LEAD POISONING IN YOUNG CHILDREN, available at http://www.
cdc.gov/nceh/lead/research/kidsBLL.htm#Defining*/20the%20problem (last visited June 18,
2004). Warren concludes, "The prerequisites for the discovery of childhood lead-poisoning's
epidemic nature were met in the Untied States by the 1920s .... But until the 1970s, the
medical and public health communities' responses remained sluggish, if not moribund."
WARREN, supra, at 43.
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actions, 84 before turning attention to the various strands of collective liability for
multiple and indeterminate defendants.
There is an analytical risk in parsing the collective tort action in this regard,
however. Often mass product tort actions combine the collective form of the
plaintiff-a class action or a state recoupment action seeking damages resulting
from the latent diseases experienced by hundreds, thousands, or even millions of
victims-with an attempt to impose liability on multiple or indeterminate
defendants-the collective defendant-through theories based upon concert of
action, alternative liability, market share liability, or simply an expanded
interpretation of the traditional doctrine of concurrent liability. The combination
of the collective plaintiff and the collective defendant, I would argue, is greater
than the sum of the parts. There is a risk that separately parsing examples of the
collective plaintiff and of the collective defendant, as I have in this section and the
next section, will obscure the extent to which contemporary mass product tort
lawsuits are fundamentally a very different animal from their tort ancestors.
A. The Collective Plaintiff
1. Class Actions
During the 1980s, class actions appeared to be the vehicle that courts
would choose to "collectivize" claims of victims resulting from mass products
84. I do not consider here certain voluntary practices of plaintiffs' attorneys in
aggregating similar cases for the purposes of preparation, discovery, and trial, including
voluntaryjoinder. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (setting forth the rule for voluntaryjoinder); Michael
D. Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its Promise: An Examination
of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IOWA L. REv. 141, 183-84 (1984) (asserting that concerns
about the effects that collateral estoppel have on joinder are not significant in asbestos cases);
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY, VOLUME II: APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 404-05 (American Law Institute Reporters' Study 1991) (discussing
voluntary joinder). Nor does this Article address the creation of networks among plaintiffs'
attorneys. See Paul Rheingold, The A4ER/29 Story--An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster
Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REv. 116, 122 (1968) (discussing the formation of the plaintiff's group);
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY, supra, at 405 (discussing networks).
Finally, this Article does not discuss the combination of a test case with a pattern settlement.
See Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BuFF. L.
REv. 433,447-48 (1960) (discussing stare decisis); ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY, supra, at 405-06 (discussing test case, pattern settlements). By themselves, these
procedural and tactical devices do not result in the imposition of collective liability in a way that
abrogates the traditional causal link between a particular plaintiff and a particular defendant.
See generally Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical
Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381 (2000)
(examining ethical and procedural implications of informal aggregation).
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torts.85 One of the most ambitious attempts to use the class action vehicle as a
means of collectivizing the tort process and eliminating any requirement of
individual causation was the decision by federal district court Judge Robert M.
Parker in Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc.86 Judge Parker certified as a class
action the claims of 3,03 1 victims of asbestos disease 87 in their litigation against
various asbestos manufacturers and then permitted the use of statistical
evidence to prove both the causal connection between the defendants' products
and the plaintiffs' injuries and the amount of each claimant's damages.88
Because of the novelty of Judge Parker's approach and the manner in which it
anticipated the use of statistical and sampling evidence in later mass products
torts litigation, I will describe the litigation in some detail.
Judge Parker's trial plan anticipated three phases. 89 During Phase I, the
jury heard a complete trial of the individual cases often class representatives
that was designed to reach resolution, for all members of the class, on the issues
of product defectiveness, the adequacy of warnings, and the appropriateness of
punitive damages.90 Judge Parker then divided the members of the plaintiff
class into five disease categories based upon which illnesses the class members
allegedly had sustained as a result of the exposure to the asbestos products.
91
As originally scheduled, the same jury, during Phase II, was to decide the
percentage of. class members in each category that had been exposed to each
defendant's products and the percentage of claims in each disease category
85. In In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996, 1011 (3d Cir. 1986) (certifying
class action of school districts against asbestos manufacturers), the Court of Appeals described
the frustrations of separately litigating mass products torts claims:
Inefficiency results primarily from relitigation of the same basic issues in case after
case. Since a different jury is empanelled in each action, it must hear the same
evidence that was presented in previous trials. A clearer example of reinventing the
wheel thousands of times is hard to imagine.... In case after case, the health
issues, the question of injury causation, and the knowledge of the defendants are
explored, often by the same witnesses.
Id. at 1001, 1003.
86. See generally Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990),
rev'd in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
87. See 751 F. Supp. at 652 (setting forth the court's plan). After the dismissal,
severance, or settlement of 733 individual cases, a class consisting of 2,298 plaintiffs went to
trial. Id. at 652-53.
88. See id. at 659-65 (describing Phase III of the plan); see also infra notes 242-45
(summarizing the use of statistical evidence in cigarette cases).
89. See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653 (setting forth an overview of the plan).
90. See id. at 653 (describing Phase I). The trial took 133 days and yielded 25,348 pages
of trial transcript. Id. During the trial, 272 expert witnesses and 292 fact witnesses testified. Id.
91. Id.
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barred by statutes of limitations or other specified defenses.92 During this
phase, the jury also would assess a lump sum determination of damages for all
plaintiffs within each specified disease category.93 The court, however, skipped
Phase II and went directly to Phase III. Following the trial of Phase III, the
parties stipulated as to what the findings of Phase H would have been, including
the relative proportion of financial responsibility of each defendant.
94
In Phase III, Judge Parker employed a statistical sampling approach--two
juries heard a sampling of cases to determine whether each sample plaintiff
suffered from an asbestos-related disease and if so, what damages that sample
plaintiff had sustained.95 The court conducted a hearing to confirm that the
randomly drawn sample plaintiffs from each disease category were
representative of the population of that group.96 The court then proposed to
award each nonsample member within any given disease category the average
damage verdict of the sample plaintiffs within that group whose cases had been
heard by the jury.
Though the plaintiffs consented to this approach, the defendants
objected.97 The defendants in Cimino argued that even as to the sample
plaintiffs there had been no determination that any particular defendant's
product had caused any particular disease sustained by a member of the
plaintiff class. This lack of individual causation, according to the defendants,
violated both the substantive law of causation and each defendant's right to a
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. 98  Judge Parker rejected this
argument, reasoning that the liability of any particular defendant for damage
awards, determined by the average of the awards of sample class members
within a disease category viewed collectively, would be comparable to what
would occur if all the damage awards had been determined individually.99
92. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 301 (5th Cir. 1998) (describing
Phase II).
93. Id.
94. See id. (describing the stipulation). The stipulation explicitly provided, however, that
defendants continued to object to Judge Parker's trial plan and that, if the appellate court
rejected the provisions of the trial plan for determining causation, the stipulated percentages of
damages were "void." See id. at 307 (stating that the "defendants were not thereby agreeing that
the trial plan. . . was a permissible way to adjudicate their liability and damages").
95. See id. at 303 (describing phase III).
96. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 664 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (stating
that "the court elected to defer that decision until after the damages trial").
97. See id. at 665 (explaining the defendant's objection on due process grounds).
98. See id. at 665-66 (explaining the defendant's constitutional challenges).
99. See id. at 666 (stating that "[i]f the existence of variables are the driving force behind
defendants' due process argument, then due process has been served").
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Unfortunately for Judge Parker and the future of attempts to overcome the
obstacles posed by the individual causation requirement, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit disagreed.100 The court first found that the trial court had
not established that a particular defendant's products caused the harm to a
particular plaintiff, thereby failing the requirement that causation "be
determined as to 'individuals, not groups.'"101 Further, in the "extrapolation
cases," the court held that the determination of damages, without either a trial
or a jury, denied the defendants their due process rights. 1
0 2
The Cimino litigation marked a key battle between proponents of the use
of the class action as a collective mechanism to address mass products torts and
those committed to the traditional model of particular claimant/particular
defendant. Since that time, class action litigation largely has fallen by the
wayside as a means of determining collective liability for victims of mass
products torts. Today, with rare exceptions' °3 or in unusual circumstances,'04
courts almost always deny class certification in mass product torts.'0 5 A
100. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 315-21 (5th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that "the extrapolation case judgments, as well as the phase III judgments, are
fatally flawed").
101. See id. at 319 (quoting In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 1990)).
102. See id. (noting that the phase III holding "necessarily requires reversal of the
judgments in the five extrapolation cases"). The Court of Appeals acknowledged the plight of
trial court judges forced to address the onslaught of asbestos litigation but concluded that "real
reform" required an asbestos-dispute resolution scheme established by Congress. See id. at 321
(observing that Congress has not acted).
103. See, e.g., In re Copley Pharm., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 485, 488-93 (D. Wyo. 1994)
(certifying class in action against manufacturer of Albuterol, a drug allegedly contaminated by
microorganisms); In re West Virginia Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchinson, 585 S.E.2d 52, 62-76 (W.
Va. 2003) (certifying class in action brought by victims of liver disease allegedly caused by
Rezulin, an oral insulin drug manufactured by defendants).
104. See, e.g., In re St. Jude Med., Inc., MDL No. 01-1316, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149, at
*39 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2004) (certifying class for purposes of medical monitoring claim but
denying class certification for injury claims); see also In re Simon II Litigation, 211 F.R.D. 86,
108, 190 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (certifying class for punitive damages only), rev'd, 407 F.3d 125,
137-38 (2d Cir. 2005) (vacating class certification order and rejecting class members' argument
that certification was warranted because constitutional limits on punitive damages created a
limited fund available to satisfy individual class members' claims).
105. See, e.g., Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 1996)
(denying class certification in case against manufacturer of epilepsy drug); In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (denying class certification of hemophiliacs
whose blood transfusions were contaminated with HIV); Perez v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 218
F.R.D. 262,276 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (denying class certification of plaintiffs making claims against
manufacturer of dietary supplement containing ephedra and caffeine); In re Baycol Prods. Litig.,
218 F.R.D. 197, 216 (D. Minn. 2003) (denying class certification of plaintiffs making claims
against manufacturer of drug prescribed to lower lipid levels of individuals with high
cholesterol); Benner v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 214 F.R.D. 157, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
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plaintiff seeking class action certification in the federal courts must satisfy the
four requirements of subsection (a) of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure'0 6 and one of three alternative requirements of subsection (b).' °7
Courts usually find that litigants seeking class certification in the context of
mass products torts fail to meet one or more of the requirements, generally on
the grounds that the cases of victims of mass products torts turn on
individualized proof of causation, reliance, comparative fault, and/or damages.
For example, in Estate of Mahoney v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 108 the
court found that the named plaintiff's claims were not necessarily "typical" of
those of other members of the proposed class, victims of tobacco-related
diseases who had been heavy smokers and who were residents of Iowa, because
different members of the proposed class probably responded differently to the
alleged misrepresentations of tobacco manufacturers. 10 9  Further, the
representative class action plaintiff could not establish, as required by Rule 23
(b)(3), that common issues of law and fact predominated over individual
issues." o The court noted that resolution of fact issues necessary to prove
causation, such as whether any particular plaintiff's cancer resulted from
smoking and whether she would have refrained from smoking or quit smoking
if the defendants had not misrepresented the risks of their products, were
individual issues of fact, not common ones, as were those issues related to
affirmative defenses (such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk)
and those involving the class members' damages or injuries."'
(denying class certification of plaintiffs making claims against manufacturer of contaminated
secondary needlesticks).
106. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (giving the requirements for class certification). The party
seeking class certification must prove that the proposed class meets the four requirements of
Rule 23(a): (1) the class is so numerous thatjoinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Id.
107. See infra notes 108-1 and accompanying text (illustrating how individualized issues
can prevent certification); infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (discussing certification
for the purpose of medical monitoring).
108. Estate ofMahoney v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 204 F.R.D. 150 (D. Iowa 2001).
109. See id. at 154 (discussing the typicality requirement).
110. See id. at 156 (applying the predominance test).
111. See id. at 156-60 (discussing the individual fact issues). Other courts, in denying
class certification to proposed nationwide classes, have noted the difficulty of applying varying
substantive principles of state law from different states. See, e.g., Perez v. Metabolife Int'l Inc.,
218 F.R.D. 262, 266 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (denying certification of a class of members from four
states due to the "difficulty of applying varying and unsettled legal principles in multiple
states"). Chief Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, for example, has described how the
trial court, in such a case, might be required to give "a kind of Esperanto instruction, merging
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Both the United States Supreme Court and Congress have limited the
ability of class action lawsuits to serve as a vehicle for overcoming the
individual causation requirement. The Supreme Court has placed important
restrictions on the ability of counsel in class actions to reach a "global
settlement" that resolves the claims of both those victims who already are
experiencing injuries and those who may sustain injuries in the future.'
2
Without the ability to reach such enforceable settlements, these settlements
become substantially less attractive from the perspective of the defendant-
manufacturers. More recently, Congress enacted, and President Bush signed
into law, the Class Action Fairness Act' 1 3 that will make it more difficult for
victims of mass torts to file actions in state courts where the class certification
requirements may be more favorable than in the federal courts.
Class actions may remain, however, a viable vehicle for handling mass
products claims in at least one situation. When members of the putative class
have been exposed to a dangerous product that may cause a latent disease, some
courts have allowed class certification for purposes of "medical monitoring"
claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), which provides for
certification of an action seeking declaratory or injunctive relief when "the
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief...
with respect to the class as a whole."'" 4 In these claims, plaintiffs typically ask
the court to establish a medical monitoring program intended to detect the onset
of any injuries or diseases that might occur in the future as a result of exposure
to defendants' products.l"5
the negligence standards of the 50 states and the District of Columbia." In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
112. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997) (overturning the
certification of a so-called "opt-out" class under Rule 23(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure because of a conflict of interest when plaintiffs' lawyers represented both those with
current injuries and those who may sustain injuries in the future as a result of past exposure to
product); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,820 (1999) (overturning the certification of a
mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) in part because of the failure to properly address
conflicts of interest within the class).
113. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited June 18, 2005).
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(2).
115. See, e.g.,In reSt. Jude Med., Inc., MDL No. 01-1396,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149, at
* 14 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2004) (certifying the class for purposes of the medical monitoring claims);
Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 793 N.E.2d 869, 877 (I11. App. Ct. 2003) (affirming dismissal
of class action seeking funds for medical monitoring of children exposed to lead-based paint
that contained lead pigments manufactured by defendants).
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Notwithstanding this narrow exception, there is little doubt that class
actions-at least those seeking compensation for injuries and diseases resulting
from exposure to mass products-have disappointed some of the early
proponents of class actions that saw them as a means of overcoming
traditionally insurmountable obstacles in proving causation in mass products
torts and similar cases.' 1 6 Barring reform that is improbable in the current
political climate, the class action mechanism does not appear to be part of the
solution to overcoming the obstacles posed by the requirement of individual
causation in mass products torts.
2. Consolidation
In a few instances, plaintiffs' attorneys and courts in mass products torts
cases have sought to use the procedural device of consolidation as a vehicle for
satisfying individual causation requirements that they otherwise could not
satisfy. As used by most courts, consolidation is most accurately viewed as a
procedural device for joining many individual actions for determination of one
or more issues that otherwise would need to be tried repetitively in individual
trials of particular plaintiffs, 1 7 but not as a means of truly imposing collective
liability on a group of defendants to benefit multiple victims or to eliminate a
requirement of individual causation.18 Yet a few trial courts have employed
116. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 867-68 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "the alternative to class-action settlement is not a fair opportunity for
each potential plaintiff to have his or her own day in court").
117. See FED. R. CIv. P. 42(a) ("When actions involving a common question of law or facts
are pending before the court, it may order ajoint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue
in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated. .. ").
118. The more typical use of consolidation as a procedural device to determine issues that
are common to all plaintiffs is illustrated by a Maryland trial court's consolidation of 8,555
asbestos cases in ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 667 A.2d 116 (Md. 1995). The jury considered the
issues of whether each defendant had been negligent or was liable under strict products liability,
and whether it should be held liable for punitive damages, on a consolidated basis. See id. at
120-22 (presenting the background information). The jury also found, for each defendant, a
ratio of the amount of punitive damages it should pay for each dollar of compensatory damages
assessed against it. Id. The remaining issues-whether each specific defendant's products
caused harm to any particular plaintiff and the amount of each plaintiffs damages-were
determined individually, either during the trial of Phase II for the six "illustrative" plaintiffs, or
during subsequent mini-trials for the remainder of the plaintiffs. Id. In short, from the
perspective of the plaintiffs, the trial plan "collectivized" the handling of whether each
defendant's acts were tortious but did not collectivize issues of establishing the causal
connection between a particular defendant's conduct and a particular victim's injury or the
determination of damages for a particular victim's injury. As such, the court's process, while
collective in nature in terms of process and procedure, substantively is a closer relative to a case
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consolidation in conjunction with statistical evidence to establish true collective
liability to benefit a group of undifferentiated plaintiffs and, in the process,
eliminate the individual causation requirement. In the Brooklyn Navy Shipyard
Litigation,"l9 for example, Judge Jack Weinstein consolidated sixty-four actions
brought by victims of asbestos-related disease for trial on all issues. 120 The
defendants contended that the plaintiffs had failed to identify the particular
manufacturer whose product injured each particular plaintiff, thus failing to
satisfy the causation requirement.' 2' The Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, upheld Judge Weinstein's finding of causation, noting that the
plaintiffs had established that they or their decedents had spent time at a
common worksite, the Brooklyn Navy Shipyard, where they were exposed to
asbestos; that the products of each defendant had been used at the shipyard and
contributed to the asbestos fibers in the air; and that each plaintiff or plaintiff's
decedent had developed diseases linked to the defendants' products. 122 The
court of appeals concluded: "Because the events happened years ago, and
many of those exposed to the asbestos are deceased, to require precision of
proof would impose an insurmountable burden."' 23 By loosening the standard
of evidentiary sufficiency on the issue of whether any particular defendant's
product contributed to any particular plaintiff's injury, Judge Weinstein and the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals used consolidation to implicitly impose a form
of collective liability with little or no proof of individual causation linking a
particular defendant and a particular plaintiff.
24
More often in consolidated cases, however, collective liability is not
anticipated, and the trial court judge goes to great lengths to stress to the jury
the requirement of a causal link between each plaintiff and a specific
in which a plaintiff is allowed to employ offensive issue preclusion to prove defendant's
conduct establishing liability.
119. In re E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd
in part, rev"d in part on other grounds sub nom. In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971
F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1994).
120. See In re E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. at 1387-88 (discussing the
propriety of consolation).
121. See In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 836 (2d Cir. 1994)
(discussing causation).
122. See id. at 837 (rejecting defendant's argument).
123. Id.
124. Id. But see Leverance v. PFS Corp., 532 N.W.2d 735, 740-44 (Wis. 1995) (reversing
trial court's judgment in consolidated cases on the grounds that the aggregative process adopted
by the trial court, where all plaintiffs were awarded judgments calculated on the basis of the
average jury awards in a few test cases, was inconsistent with the defendant's due process right
to a jury trial on the issues of causation, contributory negligence, and damages).
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defendant. 12  For example, in another consolidated asbestos case, the court
outlined the steps to be taken to assure that the jury separately considered the
causal connection between each specific plaintiff and each specific
defendant.126  After noting that common issues of law and fact favored
consolidation, the court noted that other issues, including those related to
causation, required "effort to prevent confusion and prejudice":
27
[T]he particular measures that will work best here.., include [] separate
notebooks for the jurors, tabbed for each plaintiff and each defendant,
careful attention to the presentation of evidence, and cautionary instructions
reminding the jurors that, during their deliberations, they would have to
consider each of the plaintiff's claims separately.... 128
As illustrated by these examples of consolidated cases, in most instances
consolidation imposes collective liability only in the sense that multiple
plaintiffs are able to prove those aspects of liability related to a defendant's
conduct in a single proceeding. In and of itself, consolidation does not
eliminate the need to prove a causal link between the acts of a particular
defendant and the harm sustained by a particular plaintiff. A very small
number of trial court judges, however, including Judge Weinstein, appear to
have used consolidation as a means of accomplishing collective liability when
proof of the causal connection between a particular victim and a particular
plaintiff appears insufficient to meet the ordinary civil burden of proof.
B. Liability of Multiple and Indeterminate Manufacturers
The victim of a latent disease caused by exposure to products that are
fungible or nearly fungible often is not able to identify the particular tortfeasor
that manufactured the product causing her harm, particularly when-as is often
the case-a substantial period of time, often several decades, has passed
between the time that the product was manufactured and the onset of the
plaintiff's harm. The scenario in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,129 previously
125. See, e.g., Malcolm v. Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 353-54 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that
trial court's attempts in consolidated case to assure that the jury separately evaluated causation
and damages in consolidated cases involving forty-eight plaintiffs and twenty-five defendants
were inadequate).
126. See In re New York Asbestos Litig., 145 F.R.D. 644, 653-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(discussing each factor individually), later proceedings at 149 F.R.D. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(granting consolidation).
127. See id. at 656 (finding it too early in the proceedings to determine the best plan).
128. Id.
129. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
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described, 130 is but one example of the impossible challenge that the plaintiff
frequently encounters. The claimant's entitlement to recover for her injury
generally has been denied because of her inability to prove which particular
defendant manufactured the product in cases of exposure to Agent Orange, 3 ,
asbestos insulation,1
32 lead pigment, 133 and cigarettes. 
34
The denial of liability in cases in which the victim is unable to identify the
particular injurer that caused her harm no doubt remained the general rule in
American tort law during the first wave of collective mass tort actions during
the 1980s. Yet during that era, courts creatively applied traditional tort
doctrines and invented new ones that enabled-and continue to enable-
victims in some jurisdictions, often in isolated circumstances, to recover
without proof that their harm was caused by a particular injurer. Many of these
doctrines, upon initial examination, appear to be only procedural devices that
shift the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that he was not the injurer
that caused plaintiffs harm. The realistic effect of such doctrines, however,
generally has been to impose liability without proof of individual causation
because, in actuality, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant can prove which
injurer's acts caused a particular plaintiff s harm. Further, some courts have
130. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (describing the Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories case).
131. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1263 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (finding that plaintiffs who opted out of class action settlement were unable to prove that
their diseases resulted from exposure to Agent Orange or that "any particular defendant
produced the Agent Orange to which he may have been exposed").
132. See, e.g., Bateman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1132, 1133 (5th Cir.
1986) (barring recovery in asbestos case where plaintiffs were unable to identify either the
specific products causing their diseases or any of the manufacturers of the products).
133. See, e.g., Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 549-51 (1st Cir. 1993)
(rejecting market share liability against manufacturers of lead pigment because of both the
impossibility of determining when multiple paint layers were applied during a fifty-three year
period and the variance in which manufacturers contributed to the relevant market at various
times during this period); City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 126 (3d Cir.
1993) (rejecting market share liability, noting that it "compromises fairness to defendants who
must incur sometimes staggering litigation costs as they are forced to defend all claims
involving their product irrespective of their market shares"); Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n,
Inc., 690 A.2d 169, 172 (Pa. 1997) (finding "that application of market share liability to lead
paint cases would grotesquely distort liability"). But see Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523,
532-33 (Wis. 2005) (allowing victims of childhood lead poisoning to recover against lead
pigment manufacturers on a "risk contribution" basis, similar to market share liability).
134. See, e.g., Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 506, 515 (D.N.J. 2002)
(dismissing claims against tobacco company because plaintiff "provided insufficient evidence
that decedent was exposed to [manufacturer's] product").
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held that a defendant can be found to be liable on a collective basis even if it
can prove that it was not in fact the cause of the harm to the specific plaintiff.135
1. Market Share Liability
Perhaps no other judicially created mechanism for holding defendant-
manufacturers collectively liable has tantalized academic tort commentators as
much as market share liability, 136 which originated in the California Supreme
Court's decision in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.'37 The court held that
"[e]ach defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment
represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not
have made the product which caused plaintiff's injury." 138 This holding,
claimed the California Supreme Court, results in each manufacturer's liability
reflecting the injuries caused by its own products, even though the tortious acts
of any particular defendant are never causally linked to the harm suffered by
any particular victim. 39  The court justified its holding on the basis of
instrumental goals including loss minimization (what Calabresi had referred to
as primary cost avoidance): "The manufacturer is in the best position to
discover and guard against defects in its products and to warn of harmful
effects, thus, holding it liable for defects and failure to warn of harmful effects
will provide an incentive to product safety.' 40 Further, the opinion reflects the
instrumental goal of loss distribution:'
41
From a broader policy standpoint, defendants are better able to bear the
cost of injury resulting from the manufacture of a defective product. As
was said by Justice Traynor in Escola, "[t]he cost of an injury and the loss
135. See, e.g., Hymowitzv. Eli Lilly& Co., 539N.E.2d 1069,1078 (N.Y. 1989)(adopting
a market share theory); see also infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (discussing whether
Sindell shifts the burden of proof to defendant).
136. See, e.g., HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 29, at § 20.2 (describing "developments
along the lines of [] Sindell" as "well warranted"); Finkelstein, supra note 73, at 980-81
(arguing for extension of liability, based upon Sindell principles, to creation of risk where harm
has not yet occurred); Robinson, supra note 73, at 739-40 (concluding that the imposition of
liability in DES cases on a market share liability basis is fair and serves deterrence).
137. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (setting forth a market
share theory).
138. Id. at 937.
139. See id. (explaining its theory).
140. Id. at 936.
141. Loss distribution is a part of what Calabresi described as "secondary cost avoidance."
See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (discussing secondary and tertiary cost
avoidance).
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of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured,
and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business."1
42
The court also invoked an argument based on justice. It stated: "As between
an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of
the injury.'
143
Because the defendant could be excused from liability if it proved that it
was not responsible for a particular victim's harm, it is possible to interpret
Sindell as an opinion that merely shifts the burden of proof on the issue of
causation to the defendant. In Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,144 however, the
New York Court of Appeals imposed true collective liability for the creation of
risk 14 5 when it held that a particular manufacturer of DES who could prove that
its product could not have been the one that caused the harm to the particular
victim nevertheless would be liable on a market share liability theory:
[B]ecause liability here is based on the over-all [sic] risk produced, and not
causation in a single case, there should be no exculpation of a defendant
who, although a member of the market producing DES for pregnancy use,
appears not to have caused a particular plaintiff's injury. It is merely a
windfall for a producer to escape liability solely because it manufactured a
more identifiable pill, or sold only to certain drugstores. These fortuities in
no way diminish the culpability of a defendant for marketing the product,
which is the basis of liability here.
146
The court conceded "the lack of a logical link between liability and causation in
a single case."'
147
Despite the considerable scholarly support for the idea of market share
liability--except for cases against DES manufacturers-the concept met with
virtually universal rejection by the courts during the quarter-century following
the Sindell decision. 14 8 In July 2005, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
142. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
143. Id.
144. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989).
145. See COLEMAN, supra note 38, at 399-400 (noting that the court assigned "the
defendant liability reflecting his share of the national market"); see also Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,
342 N.W.2d 37, 50-51 (Wis. 1984) (allowing plaintiff to proceed against one or more
manufacturers of DES on the theory that each defendant contributed to the "risk of injury");
Robinson, supra note 73, at 739 (justifying market share liability on the basis that fairness
requires only that the particular defendant held liable be one that created a risk of injury to the
particular plaintiff, not the injury itself).
146. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078.
147. Id. at 1078 n.3.
148. See, e.g., Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514N.E.2d 691,702 (Ohio 1987)
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in Thomas v. Mallett149 allowed a childhood lead poisoning victim's action
against manufacturers of lead pigment to proceed to trial on a "risk
contribution" (similar to market share liability) theory despite plaintiffs
inability to identify the specific manufacturers of the product that caused his
illness. 5 0 The courtjustified its opinion on grounds similar to those articulated
in Sindell. 151 On fairness grounds, the cost of the harm should be imposed on
the "arguably negligent" manufacturers, not on "an innocent plaintiff who is
probably not at fault .... ",152 On instrumental grounds, the manufacturers are
in a better position to distribute losses than is the individual victim. 1
53
The court rejected the manufacturers' arguments that their product lacked
the fungibility necessary for market share liability, finding that the jury should
be allowed to consider the testimony of plaintiff's expert that the differences in
chemical composition between various lead pigments did not affect their
bioavailability and hence the consequences of exposure to lead-based paint. 1
54
The defendant-manufacturers argued that it would not be feasible for the trial
court to administer a risk-contribution regime and to accurately determine each
defendant's market share because the lead pigment-containing paint present in
the three houses where the child had lived could have been applied at any point
(rejecting market share theory for asbestos products generally); Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561
A.2d 511, 529 (N.J. 1989) (rejecting market share liability except in the context of DPT
vaccines). But see Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109, 113 (Ct. App. 1992)
(allowing market share liability in the context of asbestos brake pads).
149. Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005).
150. See id. at 532-33 (allowing the plaintiff's claim to proceed). The Court held that
plaintiff is required to prove the following elements in order to recover on a strict products
liability claim applying the risk contribution theory:
(1) That the white lead carbonate was defective when it left the possession or
control of the pigment manufacturers;
(2) That it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer;
(3) That the defect was a cause of [Plaintiff]'s injuries or damages;
(4) That the pigment manufacturer engaged in the business of producing or
marketing white lead carbonate or, put negatively, that this is not an isolated or
infrequent transaction not related to the principal business of the pigment
manufacturer; and
(5) That the product was one which the company expected to reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition it was when sold.
Id. at 564.
151. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text (describing the court's opinion in
Sindell).
152. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 557.
153. See id. at 558 (stating the instrumentalist proposition).
154. See id. at 559 (concluding that fungibility does not require chemical identity).
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between 1900 and 1978. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, responded
that the manufacturers "are essentially arguing that their negligent conduct
should be excused because they got away with it for too long."'55 This
reasoning ignores the fact, noted by one of the dissenting judges, that "many of
the defendants produced white lead carbonate for only a small fraction of the
seventy-eight-year period during which paint containing white lead carbonate
could have been applied to the walls of [the plaintiffs] three residences."'
156
Thomas v. Mallett could turn out to be the most direct and important
challenge to the individual causation requirement yet. In one of two strongly
worded opinions, the dissenting judges argue:
The end result of the majority opinion is that the defendants, lead pigment
manufacturers, can be held liable for a product they may or may not have
produced, which may or may not have caused the plaintiffs injuries, based
on conduct that may have occurred over 100 years ago when some of the
defendants were not even part of the relevant market... [N]one of these
facts seem to matter to the majority.
57
Justice Prosser, one of the dissenting judges, writes an opinion reminiscent
of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's reversal on due process grounds of Judge
Parker's attempts in Cimino v. Raymark Industries'58 to calculate individual
class members' damages awards through a collective process without individual
adjudications. Prosser suggests that "the very real possibility that innocent
defendants will be held liable for wrongs they did not commit' 59 raises serious
procedural due process concerns because defendants are denied the opportunity
to present the defense, well settled under tort law, that they did not cause the
harm.
60
At this time, it is impossible to predict whether the decision in Thomas
v. Mallet is an isolated opinion driven by the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
desire to identify a funding source to address the public health crisis posed
by childhood lead poisoning 61 or whether it is a harbinger of things to
155. Id. at 562.
156. Id. at 594 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 567-68 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
158. Cimino v. Raymark Industries, 151 F.3d 297, 319 (5th Cir. 1998); see supra notes
86-102 and accompanying text (describing Judge Parker's efforts).
159. Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 595 (Wis. 2005) (Prosser, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 593 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (discussing the defendant's due process
argument). He also raises substantive due process concerns because of the retroactive
imposition of liability. See id. at 595-96 (stating that the majority's opinion "shocks the
conscience").
161. Several aspects of the opinion suggest this possibility. See Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at
533-34 (describing health consequences of childhood lead poisoning and prevalence of lead-
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come. As a practical matter, the determination of the risk contribution of
each defendant over a seventy-five year period appears to be an impossible
task for a trial court and jury. In fact, when the Wisconsin Supreme Court
became the first court to accept the risk contribution theory in a DES case
in 1984, it recognized the substantial practical problems with market share
liability 162 and distinguished risk contribution liability from it. The Court
held that in assigning a percentage of liability to each manufacturer-
defendant, the jury should consider not only its respective market share, but
also the relative degree of the egregiousness of its conduct compared to that
of other manufacturers.1 63  In determining the manufacturers' relative
market shares, one factor in the risk contribution calculation, the jury
would be required to consider the following factors: the timing of the
various producers' entry, exit, and sometimes re-entry into the relevant
market; the great differences in the amount of lead-pigment contained in
based paint in American residential units); id. at 552-54 (acknowledging liability of landlords
for failure to maintain lead-based paint, but noting absence of effective remedy in litigation
against landlords because of insurance policy exclusions and state legislation granting
immunity).
162. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of determining market shares
in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co. See Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 53 (Wis. 1984)
(adopting risk contribution theory in action against DES manufacturers). The court stated:
The primary factor which prevents us from following Sindell is the practical
difficulty of defining and proving market share .... There are several reasons for
this: The DES market apparently was quite fluid, with companies entering and
leaving the market over the years; some companies no longer exist and some that
still exist may not have relevant records; and apparently there are no accurate
nationwide records pertaining to the overall production and marketing of DES. We
view defining the market and apportioning market share as a near impossible task if
it is to be done fairly and accurately in order to approximate the probability that a
defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries .... The defendants are faced with
possible liability for DES which they may not have produced or marketed.
Id. at 48-49.
163. See id. at 53 (announcing the factors the jury should consider). The court stated:
In assigning a percentage of liability to each defendant, the jury may consider
factors which include, but are not limited to, the following: whether the drug
company conducted tests on DES for safety and efficacy in use for pregnancies; to
what degree the company took a role in gaining FDA approval of DES for use in
pregnancies; whether the company had a small or large market share in the relevant
area; whether the company took the lead or merely followed the lead of others in
producing or marketing DES; whether the company issued warnings about the
dangers of DES; whether the company produced or marketed DES after it knew or
should have known of the possible hazards presented to the public; and whether the
company took any affirmative steps to reduce the risk of injury to the public.
Id. at 53.
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various lead-based paints;164 how much of the plaintiff's exposure occurred
at each of three houses where he lived; and the possible effect of bioavailability
on the effects of exposure (disputed between the parties). The jury's
determination of market share here would be far more challenging than in the
DES situation, where the chemical formula of manufacturers' products were
identical and the products causing the harm were consumed by the victim's
mother in a specific period lasting less than nine months. The jury then would
be required to consider these factors along with its evaluation of the level of
egregiousness of each of the manufacturer's conduct. It is difficult to see how
combining "apples and oranges"-the percentage of market share and level of
egregiousness of each defendant-in any way makes the jury's calculation
more manageable.
On the other hand, the availability of either the market share or risk
contribution liability theory in a collective action brought by a state or
municipality against an industry 165 might provide an industry facing the
prospect of huge liability exposure and possible bankruptcy with strong
incentives to settle. As Judge Richard A. Posner has noted, the liability
exposure in a collective tort action poses risks to industries that a series of
individual tort actions do not,166 and an industry finding itself "under intense
pressure to settle"'167 "may not wish to roll these dice."'
168 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court's opinion in Thomas v. Mallett, still at the summary judgment
stage, begins with an extended recitation of allegations against lead-pigment
manufacturers, drawn from plaintiffs allegations and the testimony of his
experts, but presented as objective truth. 169 The court's call for trial judges to
164. Obviously, this factor applies only in actions against manufacturers of lead-based
paint, not actions against pigment manufacturers. The amount of lead by weight in paint ranged
from one percent by weight to seventy percent or more by weight. Compare American
Standards Ass'n, Standard No. Z661, at 5 (1955) (setting forth the voluntary industry standard
adopted in 1955, limiting lead content in paint to no more than one percent of total weight) with
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CIRCULAR OF THE BUR. OF STANDARDS No. 89, UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT MASTER SPECIFICATION FOR PAINT, WHITE, AND TINTED PAINTS MADE ON A WHITE
BASE, SEMIPASTE, AND READY MIXED, FED. SPEC. BOARD, STAND. SPEC. No. 1OB, at 2 (3d ed.,
Apr. 25, 1927) (requiring white base semi-paste paint to be purchased by the federal
government to include a minimum of forty-five percent and a maximum of seventy percent
white lead).
165. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (providing examples of the "new form"
of collective plaintiff).
166. See In re Rhone-Poulence Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting
mandamus to decertify class action certified by trial judge).
167. Id. at 1298.
168. Id.
169. Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 533-48 (Wis. 2005). Justice Wilcox, in his
dissenting opinion, observes that the majority's "over 50 pages of so-called 'facts' ... are
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perform the impossible feat of determining the relative contributions of
defendant-manufacturers to risk contribution, coupled with its gratuitous
"piling on" of unproven facts, may be intended more to induce settlement than
it is to meaningfully guide lower courts' administration of causation
determinations in mass products torts.
2. Concurrent Causation Resulting in Indivisible Harm
Traditional common law holds that where the tortious acts of two or more
defendants are each a cause-in-fact of an indivisible injury to the plaintiff, the
defendants are jointly and severally liable. 70 Because each defendant's acts are
a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury, this is not an example of a victim
recovering without proof that a particular defendant caused her harm. In recent
decades, however, courts sometimes have applied concurrent causation in a
manner that has enabled the plaintiff to recover without identifying the
particular defendant whose products have harmed her.' 71 In Rutherford v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc.,72 for example, the California Supreme Court held in a
consolidated action for asbestos-related personal injuries that plaintiffs "need
not prove with medical exactitude that fibers from a particular defendant's
asbestos-containing products were those, or among those, that actually began
the cellular process of malignancy."' 173 The court acknowledged that it was
scientifically unclear whether each exposure to asbestos and the resulting
"scarring of the lungs contributes cumulatively to the formation of a tumor" or
whether, on the other hand, "only one fiber or group of fibers actually causes
the formation of a tumor," in which case, "the others would not be legal causes
simply irrelevant" to the issue at hand. Id. at 569.
170. See, e.g., Walt Disney World v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 202 (Fla. 1987) (upholding
joint and several liability where defendants acting independently caused indivisible injury);
Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69, 69 (Mass. 1902) (stating that "if two or more wrongdoers
contribute to an injury, they may be sued either jointly or severally").
171. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir.
1973) (addressing asbestos products), cert. den., 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Rutherford v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1223 (Cal. 1997) (holding that plaintiff must prove only that
exposure to defendant's product contributed to the risk of developing cancer, not that such
products actually played in a role in causing the disease); Purcell v. Asbestos Corp., 959 P.2d
89, 95 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that when exposure to the asbestos products of multiple
manufacturers each increased the risk of mesothelioma, a jury could find causation for each
manufacturer).
172. Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997).
173. Id. at 1206.
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of the plaintiffs injuries."'17 4 The court argued: "Plaintiffs cannot be expected
to prove the scientifically unknown details of carcinogenesis, or trace the
unknowable path of a given asbestos fiber."' 75 Instead, the court held that:
[P]laintiffs may prove causation in asbestos-related cancer cases by
demonstrating that the plaintiffs exposure to defendant's asbestos-
containing product in reasonable medical probability was a substantial
factor in contributing to the aggregate dose of asbestos the plaintiff or
decedent inhaled or ingested, and hence to the risk of developing asbestos-
related cancer, without the need to demonstrate that fibers from the
defendant's particular product were the ones, or among the ones, that
actually produced the malignant growth.1
76
Traditionally, tort law generally understood cause-in-fact as something
more than an increase in the risk of an injury. 177 But in Rutherford v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc., the effect of the novel application of concurrent causation is to
impose liability without identification of the particular defendant that caused a
particular plaintiff's injury. The victim was exposed to the asbestos products of
many manufacturers. These products may have increased the victim's risk of
suffering from cancer, and it was impossible for any of the defendants to show
that its products were not an actual cause of the cancer, just as it is impossible
for the victim to prove that any particular manufacturer's product, in fact, did
contribute to his cancer. Under the court's holding, these manufacturers were
held collectively liable.
3. Alternative Liability
A number of courts have held defendant-manufacturers liable under a
theory of alternative liability for latent diseases suffered by a particular victim
even when it cannot be shown which manufacturer's product harmed the
plaintiff.178 The origins of alternative liability lie in the classic case of Summers
174. Id. at 1218.
175. Id. at 1219.
176. Id.
177. But see Reynolds v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694, 698 (1865) (holding that
where defendant's negligence greatly multiplies the chance of an accident, negligence itself is
evidence of causation); Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814,815 (N.Y. 1920) (holding that evidence
of violation of statute intended to prevent the kind of injury or accident that actually occurred is
itself evidence of causation).
178. See, e.g., Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1474 (10th Cir. 1988) (shifting
burden to defendant manufacturers to prove absence of cause-in-fact); Poole v. Alpha
Therapeutic Corp., 696 F. Supp. 351, 356 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (same); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343
N.W.2d 164, 176-77 (Mich. 1984) (same); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305, 1316
909
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v. Tice179 in which a hunter was injured when shot in the eye by one of his two
hunting companions. 10 The victim was able to prove that both defendants had
fired negligently, but he could not establish which defendant's shot was in fact
the cause of his substantial injuries.181 The California Supreme Court held that
because the two defendants had each acted negligently toward the plaintiff,
although each acted independently, the burden shifted to each defendant to
prove that his negligent act was not the cause of the plaintiffs injury.'82 Unless
this burden was met, the defendants would be held jointly and severally liable.
In short, under alternative liability, the plaintiff need not prove with
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (same); see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig, 597 F.
Supp. 740, 822-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding a version of alternative liability to be a viable
claim against manufacturers of Agent Orange in an opinion approving settlement of class
action). In Menne, the plaintiff developed mesothelioma after working for forty years as a
pipefitter and plumbing and heating contractor. Plaintiff proved that he had been exposed to
asbestos products manufactured by each of the ten defendants but could not prove that exposure
to any particular defendant's product was a substantial cause of his disease, a requirement under
Nebraska law. In these circumstances, the court held that the burden shifted to each defendant
to prove that "exposure was unlikely to have been frequent or long enough to be a substantial
factor in causing Menne's mesothelioma." Menne, 861 F.2d at 1468. The court acknowledged
that "[w]here a defendant lacks evidence as to the frequency or duration of exposure, the burden
shift may well result in a finding that the defendant is a cause of the harm." Id. at 1469.
179. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
180. See id. at 1-2 (stating the facts of the case).
181. See id. at 2-4 (defining the issue).
182. See id. at 10 (considering the relative positions of the party and the results of placing
the burden on the plaintiff); see also Menne, 861 F.2d at 1468-69 (shifting the burden to the
defendant); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965) (shifting the burden of proof to
the defendant); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 28(b) (Proposed Final Draft No. 7, 2005)
(shifting the burden of proof to the defendant). In Menne, the court stated:
Under these conditions, where [the plaintiff] can demonstrate the likelihood of
exposure to visible dust from a defendant's product(s), Nebraska law would then
require that defendant to prove the exposure was unlikely to have been frequent or
long enough to be a substantial factor in causing [the plaintiff's] mesothelioma. In
other words, where the requirement of but-for causation would defeat a plaintiff's
claim in a concurrent cause case, we believe that Nebraska would adopt the more
lenient substantial factor test of causation.
Menne, 861 F.2d at 1468-69. The proposed final draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts
states:
When the plaintiff sues all of multiple actors and proves that each engaged in
tortious conduct that exposed the plaintiff to a risk of physical harm and that the
tortious conduct of one or more of them caused the plaintiff's harm but the plaintiff
cannot reasonably be expected to prove which actor caused the harm, the burden of
proof, including both production and persuasion, on factual causation is shifted to
the defendants.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 28(b) (Proposed Final Draft No. 7,2005).
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particularity the identity of the injuring party in order to recover. In the absence
of rebuttal, the defendants are held liable collectively.
In the modem context, victims have sought to expand the applicability of
the doctrine of alternative liability beyond a context involving "one plaintiff
and two defendants" to the larger arena of mass products torts, involving, for
example, "180 plaintiffs... and at least 16 defendants."' 183 Courts, however,
have found significant differences between the fact scenario in a case like
Summer v. Tice and that in the mass products torts context. First, as the
Michigan Supreme Court has noted:
Perhaps the most fundamental, and arguably the most important, factual
difference between Summers and this case is that in Summers, each
defendant was negligent toward the sole plaintiff; each could have caused
the injury to the plaintiff although only one in fact did so. Here, the
plaintiffs do not even claim that each of the defendants was negligent
toward each of the plaintiffs. Therefore, each of the defendants in this case
could not have caused injury to each of the plaintiffs. Stated differently, in
Summers, each defendant was negligent toward the plaintiff; here, each
defendant was negligent toward a plaintiff, but each defendant was not
negligent toward each plaintiff. Thus, all defendants were not negligent
toward each plaintiff, and each defendant could not have caused each
plaintiff's injury.'
84
On the other hand, looking at alternative liability in the context of mass
products torts from the instrumental perspective suggests that this use of
alternative liability is unobjectionable. As Judge Weinstein notes:
In mass tort cases... dropping the requirement that a plaintiff identify a
particular defendant as the cause in fact of his injuries does not undermine
the principle that a defendant should only be held responsible for the
damage it caused. As long as a plaintiff can prove general causation, i.e.,
that he was injured by the type of product or substance manufactured by
defendants, and as long as there is a rational method for determining the
percentage of the total harm caused to all those damaged by each of the
possible defendants, the principle remains intact."8 5
The second issue that arises in mass tort cases, but not in Summers, is
whether all possible manufacturers whose products might have harmed the
victim or victims are named as defendants in the legal action. Courts frequently
regard it as unfair to hold defendant-manufacturers jointly and severally liable
183. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 172 (Mich. 1984) (distinguishing the
case from Summers).
184. Id. at 172-73.
185. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 823 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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in a situation in which the plaintiff cannot prove that any of the defendants
before the court in fact caused the harm because not all manufacturers have
been joined as defendants. 186  Other courts, however, have been more
understanding of the victim's situation and have not imposed upon plaintiffs
the frequently impossible obligation of suing all manufacturers. Instead, these
courts have required plaintiffs to "make a genuine attempt to locate and identify
the tortfeasor responsible for the individual injury.',
187
Though some courts have allowed the use of alternative liability to prove
causation in a mass products case in which the particular victim cannot identify
the particular injurer that caused her harm, most courts reject the application of
alternative liability principles in these cases. This is because the large number
of potential injurers would result in too many "false positives"-manufacturers
would be held liable even though only one or a few among many manufacturers
were in fact the injurer(s) responsible for the victim's injury-and because the
plaintiff typically cannot identify and join all the potential injurers in her legal
action. 188 In short, except in cases meeting specific criteria that typically do not
occur in the mass products torts context, alternative liability is unlikely to prove
effective in overcoming the obstacle of individual causation.
4. Enterprise or Industry-wide Liability
The three approaches for finding product manufacturers collectively liable
that have previously been discussed in this section-market share liability,
concurrent causation resulting in indivisible harm, and alternative liability-are
186. See, e.g., Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 725 (Haw. 1991) (requiring
joinder of"all responsible parties"); Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691,
697 (Ohio 1987) (stating that where there were over 165 asbestos manufacturers, "the only way
to make sure that the guilty defendant was before the court would be to sue all asbestos
companies").
187. Abel, 343 N.W.2d at 173. Similarly, in Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453,1466
(10th Cir. 1988), the Court of Appeals held that "in cases of concurrent causation such as this, if
all or substantially all of the available and identifiable, implicated manufacturers are before the
court, and if some of these defendants can be shown to have each contributed some harm at a
possibly substantial level, then all potential defendants need not be before the court." Id. at
1466.
188. See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593,
621 n.42 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (limiting alternative liability to cases involving a small number of
tortfeasors, all of whom were before the court); Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924, 930-31
(Cal. 1980) (same); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E. 2d. 1069, 1074 (N.Y. 1989)
(rejecting application of alternative liability because it requires that defendants have better
access to information regarding identity of injurer and that all possible injurers be joined in
action).
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all approaches applicable to situations in which each of the mass product
manufacturers or potential injurers is acting independently or in parallel with
each other. The remaining two theories of collective liability-industry-wide
liability (enterprise liability) and concert of action or civil conspiracy-apply
when the defendant-manufacturers have acted jointly or cooperated with each
other.
In Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 189 Judge Jack Weinstein held
six manufacturers of blasting caps and their trade association potentially liable,
jointly and severally, on a theory of "enterprise liability" (subsequent courts
more often have referred to it as "industry wide liability"' 90) for damages to
children resulting from eighteen separate accidents. Judge Weinstein justified
his decision on the grounds that defendants had cooperated in a safety program
through a trade association, and acting eitherjointly or in parallel, had adopted
common safety features that were inadequate-they did not provide for
warnings on dangerous products.' 9' However, since Judge Weinstein's
decision, courts almost universally have rejected liability based upon
"enterprise" or industry-wide liability.' 92 For example, in Ryan v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 193 the court refused to apply enterprise liability and described it as
"repugnant to the most basic tenets of tort law."194
5. Civil Conspiracy and Concert ofAction
Beginning in the early 1980s, courts also began using the concepts of
concert of action and civil conspiracy to hold manufacturers of products
collectively liable to one or more victims harmed by fungible products even
when a causal connection could not be established between a particular
manufacturer and a particular victim.'9 Under the well established doctrine of
189. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
190. See, e.g., Sindell, 607 P.2d at 934 (finding "industry wide liability" to be the more
accurate term).
191. See Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 370-80 (analyzing the plaintiffs' claims).
192. See, e.g., Schwartzbauer v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
(holding that plaintiffs did not state a claim); Ryan v. Eli Lilly& Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1017
(D.S.C. 1981) (rejecting the theory); Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 567 (Wis. 2005)
(rejecting enterprise liability, in part because "the record indicates that the 'paint industry was
highly competitive, with each paint company jealously guarding the secrecy of their paint
formulas''); Zaffi v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 247 (Mo. 1984) (requiring causation).
193. Ryan v. Eli Lilly& Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
194. See id. at 1017 (rejecting enterprise theory).
195. See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(allowing plaintiffs to proceed on concert of action theory); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.
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concert of action, manufacturers of products may be held jointly and severally
liable if they "acted in concert," that is, if they acted pursuant to a common plan
or design. 196 Some courts equate "civil conspiracy" with "concert of action.1
197
Other courts distinguish the two concepts on the grounds that civil conspiracy
requires the joint tortfeasors to share intent to accomplish an unlawful
objective, but tort liability for concert of action merely requires that the
tortfeasors engage in tortious conduct while acting in concert. 1
98
Courts have little difficulty in holding manufacturers liable on a concert of
action basis where it can be proved that there was an explicit agreement among
manufacturers to engage in tortious conduct. 199 The courts take different
approaches, however, on the issue of whether "consciously parallel
conduct" is sufficient to create concert of action liability by "implied or
tacit agreement or understanding." 200 In Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., the New
York Court of Appeals upheld the jury's finding of concert of action based
upon the DES manufacturers' "consciously parallel behavior" in marketing
DES without adequate testing. 20 1 Other courts have held that parallel
activity by several product manufacturers is insufficient to establish concert
of action.20 2
2d 164, 176 (Mich. 1984) (finding that plaintiffs made sufficient allegations to support their
concert of action claim despite their inability to identify the specific DES manufacturer); Bichler
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E. 2d 182, 188 (N.Y. 1982) (holding the defendant liable on a
concerted action theory for injuries caused by prenatal exposure to DES).
196. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 29, at § 10.1 (explaining concert of action).
197. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. P & B Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546,1564 (3d Cir. 1994)
(stating that common law of civil conspiracy encompasses liability for concerted action); In re
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(stating that concert of action and civil conspiracy are intertwined and require the same factual
allegations); Boyle v. Anderson Fire Fighters Ass'n Local 1262, 497 N.E.2d 1073, 1079 (Ind.
App. 1986) (stating that concert of action in commission of tort is sometimes referred to as
"civil conspiracy").
198. See, e.g., Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1020 (S.D. Iowa
2001) (stating that civil conspiracy requires that conspirators agree to commit an injurious
result, which is not required for concert of action).
199. See, e.g., Bichler, 436 N.E. 2d at 188 (concluding that plaintiffs need not show an
express agreement between DES manufacturers if an implied agreement can be inferred from
"consciously parallel conduct"); see also Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 932 (Cal. 1980)
(rejecting a concert of action theory where plaintiffs failed to show a tacit agreement among
DES manufacturers to fail to conduct adequate tests or to give sufficient warnings); Abel v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 343 N.W. 2d 164, 176 (Mich. 1984) (holding defendants liable in a concert of
action claim where plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were jointly engaged in negligently
manufacturing and promoting DES).
200. Bichler, 436 N.E. 2d at 187.
201. See id. at 188 (finding consciously parallel conduct by itself to be enough).
202. See, e.g., Sindell, 607 P.2d at 933 (rejecting a concert of action claim where the
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As described in the next Part, concert of action has emerged as an
important theory for holding manufacturers liable in many cases, including
the tobacco litigation of the late 1990s and the twenty-first century.
Concert of action, however, allows the victim to overcome the requirement
of individual causation only in those instances in which she can prove an
agreement to engage in tortious conduct.
Some of the approaches developed during the 1980s for circumventing
the individual causation requirement when proof of such causation, as a
practical matter, was impossible-including market share liability and
industry-wide liability-have been limited, for the most part, to the factual
contexts in which they originally were adopted. Some courts creatively and
expansively applied traditional notions of concurrent causation resulting in
indivisible harm to the mass products contexts, but most did not. And
alternative liability and concert of action generally were limited to
specific-and unusual-circumstances. Until the 1990s, the traditional tort
requirement that the victim prove that her harm was caused by a particular
injurer remained largely intact. Then came the tobacco litigation.
IV. The Second Wave of Collective Mass Products Torts Actions
A. The Collective PlaintiffRedux
1. Government Recoupment Actions
The most highly publicized litigation in recent decades has been the
actions brought by state governments against manufacturers of tobacco
products seeking reimbursement or "recoupment" of medical assistance
payments and other expenditures necessitated by tobacco-related
illnesses. 0 3 The success of the states in the settlement of the tobacco
litigation has led to the filing of recoupment actions, by either
defendants' parallel or imitative conduct consisted of solely relying upon each others' testing
and promotion of DES); Hymowitz v. Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1074-75 (finding that
"parallel activity, without more, is insufficient to establish the agreement element necessary to
maintain a concerted action claim"); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 379 (Wash. 1984)
(rejecting the concerted action theory as a basis of liability in a DES case despite evidence of a
substantial amount of parallel activity among the defendant manufacturers).
203. See, e.g., Complaint, Moore ex rel. State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch.
Ct. Jackson County, filed May 23, 1994), available at Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra
note 22 (setting forth the complaint against the tobacco company).
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municipalities or states, against the manufacturers of other products,
notably handguns2°
4 and lead pigment. 20
5
The nature of the recoupment action does not require the government-
plaintiff to prove that products manufactured by any particular defendant
caused the tobacco-related disease of any particular victim/Medicaid recipient.
The government acts as a collective plaintiff, suing in relation to the claims of
those victims whose medical expenses have been paid for by state medical
assistance programs.20 6 The underlying damage claims in government
recoupment actions generally focus, at least nominally, on the financial harm
caused to the state itself by tobacco-related illness or gun violence. The
substantive legal bases for the claims often are not traditional torts that require
proof of specific causation of a physical injury sustained by a particular victim,
but rather "less particular" torts claiming that the state has suffered a wrong in
its own right when it has reimbursed the expenses caused by tobacco-related
illnesses. These legal theories include misrepresentation, public nuisance,
unjust enrichment and restitution, and indemnity or indemnification.
In the decades before the mid-1990s, plaintiffs who had sued tobacco
companies for their tobacco-related illnesses had been uniformly
unsuccessful. 2 7  Often, the particular plaintiff was unable to show that
cigarettes manufactured by any particular defendant had caused her tobacco-
related disease. Instead, the defendants in these actions argued successfully
that a particular plaintiff's cancer had been caused by another manufacturer's
204. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1156 (Ohio
2002) (reversing dismissal of claims against gun manufacturers). But see, e.g., City of
Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 421 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of
claims against gun manufacturers).
205. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., No. 1-03-3276, 2005 Ill. App.
LEXIS 14, at *8 (I11. App. Ct. Jan. 14, 2005) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss); City of
Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 885, at *18 (Wis. App. Ct. Nov. 9,
2004) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment); State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., No
99-5226, 2001 R.I. Super. LEXIS 37, at *56 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 2,2001) (denying, partially,
defendants' motion to dismiss claims).
206. The government sues only for those amounts of medical expenses that have been paid
to victims of the tobacco-related disease, not for other claims that the individual victims might
have against tobacco manufacturers. See, e.g., Floyd v. Thompson, 227 F.3d 1029, 1037-38
(7th Cir. 2000) (holding that Medicaid recipients do not have an entitlement to a portion of the
proceeds of the Master Settlement Agreement between forty-six states and the tobacco
manufacturers).
207. See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance As a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN.
L. REv. 741, 754-56 (2003) (discussing tobacco litigation before government recoupment
actions); Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51 DEPAULL. REv.
331, 331 (2001) (stating that smokers began suing tobacco companies in the early 1950s).
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products, exposure to different carcinogens, or the plaintiffs own lifestyle
factors.2 °8
In 1994, the State of Mississippi filed the first of the state recoupment
actions against the tobacco companies.20 9 The complaint failed to include the
claims based upon the traditional theories of recovery against product
manufacturers-strict products liability, negligence, and implied warranty-
and instead included only three claims: ones based upon public nuisance,
unjust enrichment, and indemnity. By using these torts in the novel context of
products liability actions, the state attempted to avoid both the need to prove
individual causation-that a particular manufacturer caused a specific smoker's
illness-and the defendant's use of well established defenses based on a
smoker's own conduct, such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
Within three years after the filing of the Mississippi complaint, at least forty
states had filed suits against the tobacco manufacturers.210 Many of these states
211 212also included claims for public nuisance, unjust enrichment or restitution,
208. See Robert L. Rabin, Essay: A Sociological History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation,
44 STAN. L. REv. 853,860 (1992) (explaining the failures of early tobacco litigation); see also
Sackman v. Liggett Group, 173 F.R.D. 358, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing projects funded
by the tobacco industry defendants, some of which linked "environmental factors and other non-
smoking factors, such as air pollution, geographic location, type of employment, and place of
birth, with the incidences of disease commonly associated with smoking").
209. Complaint, Moore ex rel. State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct.
Jackson County, filed May 23, 1994), available at Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra note
22.
210. See Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation, supra note 207, at 337 (discussing the state health
care reimbursement cases); Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra note 22 (setting forth the
complaints).
211. See, e.g., Complaint, State ex rel. Woods v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., No. CV-96-
14769 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Maricopa County, filed Aug. 20, 1996) (alleging public nuisance claims
in count 9), available at Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra note 22; Complaint, People v.
Philip Morris, No. 96-L13146 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County, filed Nov. 12,1996) (alleging a public
nuisance claim in count 9), available at Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra note 22;
Complaint, State v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. CL71048 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Polk County,
filed Nov. 27, 1996) (alleging a public nuisance claim in count VIII), available at Tobacco
Litigation Documents, supra note 22; Complaint, Moore v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429
(Miss. Ch. Ct. Jackson County, filed May 23, 1994) (alleging a public nuisance claim in Count
Three at 89-91), available at Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra note 22 (setting forth the
complaints); see also complaints filed by the states of Oklahoma, Texas and Utah, available at
Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra note 22 (setting forth the complaints).
212. See, e.g., Conyeexrel. Ohio v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d488,491(6thCir. 1999)
(claiming tobacco manufacturers had been "unjustly enriched at the expense of the State of Ohio
[and had] unlawfully shifted the financial responsibility for their conduct to the state"); Philip
Morris, Inc. v Glendening, 709 A.2d 1230, 1234 & n.6 (Md. 1998) (alleging unjust enrichment
of defendants and reciting state's payment of three billion dollars in medical assistance for
tobacco-related healthcare costs).
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and indemnity (indemnification). 213 These states and others also filed claims
based upon common law misrepresentation, 214 antitrust violations, 2  and
federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) theories.216 None
of these substantive claims, though they would recover the medical expenses
incurred by individual victims of tobacco-related disease, required the
governmental plaintiff to prove that products manufactured by a particular
defendant caused a particular victim's disease. In still other instances, states
passed statutes that explicitly eliminated defenses based upon the state's
inability to prove causation between the manufacture of a product by a specific
manufacturer and the illness resulting to any particular victim of tobacco-
related illness.21 7 Courts never had a chance to determine the legal viability of
these novel substantive claims in the tobacco litigation because the states'
actions against the tobacco companies ultimately were settled.218
The success of the tobacco litigation has led states and municipalities to
file recoupment actions against manufacturers of lead pigment, seeking
reimbursement of medical expenses paid to victims of childhood lead
poisoning,219 and against manufacturers of handguns for medical expenses paid
213. See, e.g., Complaint, Moore v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct. Jackson
County, filed May 23, 1994) (alleging an indemnity claim in Count Two at 84-88), available
at Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra note 22.
214. See, e.g., Complaint, State v. Philip Morris, Inc., (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997), available at
Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra note 22. Similar complaints were also filed by Arizona,
Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and West Virginia. Id.
215. E.g., Complaint, Kelly ex rel. State. v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 96-84281-CZ (Mich.
Cir. Ct. Ingham County, filed Aug. 21, 1996) (alleging violations of Michigan Antitrust Reform
Act in Count Two, 201-08), available at Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra note 22.
Similar complaints were also filed by Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Texas, Washington, and
West Virginia. Id.
216. See, e.g., Complaint, State v. Philip Morris, Inc., (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (alleging, in
Thirteenth Cause of Action, fraud under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act),
available at Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra note 22. Similar complaints filed by New
Jersey, Texas, and Utah are also available at id.
217. See, e.g., 33 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1911 (2001) (stating that the state may proceed under a
market share theory of liability).
218. The tobacco industry settled with four individual states initially and later with the
remaining forty-six states in the "Master Settlement Agreement." The Master Settlement
Agreement settled the state recoupment actions brought by the forty-six states for $206 billion
but did not grant the tobacco companies immunity from individual or class action claims. See
McClendon v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1254-55 (1 th Cir. 2001) (describing
terms of the Master Settlement Agreement). The agreement also obligated the tobacco
companies to refrain from youth-oriented advertising. It did not, however, include any
provisions acknowledging the FDA's regulatory powers over tobacco products.
219. See supra note 205 (providing examples of lawsuits against lead paint manufacturers).
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to victims and other expenses incurred by the government as a result of
handgun violence.220  Regardless of whether the government entity's
recoupment action is based upon a tort-such as public nuisance or unjust
enrichment-that arguably does not require the plaintiff to prove a causal link
between a particular defendant and a particular plaintiff, or a statute providing
the same, the lawsuit typically seeks to recover the medical expenses accruing
from the injuries experienced by a group of victims without proof that that any
particular victim's injury was caused by products manufactured by a particular
defendant.
2. Actions by Medical Insurers, Union Health Funds, and Hospitals
The states' success in achieving the tobacco settlement also spawned a
number of actions brought by third-party entities alleging that their costs had
been increased by the wrongful acts of tobacco companies, and therefore, they
should be able to recover these costs under legal theories including
misrepresentation and RICO. 221 Each of these actions, brought by health
222insurers, trusts organized by unions to provide health care benefits to workers
and their families, 223 and hospitals 224 alleged that the wrongful acts of tobacco
manufacturers resulted in the plaintiff sustaining financial losses when it paid
the medical costs of the victims of tobacco disease. Similarly, in Falise v.
American Tobacco Co.,225 the trust established by the bankruptcy court to
handle claims brought by millions of victims of asbestos-related disease against
former asbestos products manufacturer Johns-Manville Corporation sued the
manufacturers of tobacco products, alleging that because of the synergistic
effect of asbestos and tobacco products in causing various diseases, the trust
had paid claims filed against it that in fact had been caused, at least in part, by
tobacco products.226
220. See supra note 204 (providing examples of lawsuits against handgun manufacturers).
221. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 345,
388 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss claims of medical insurer based
on misrepresentation and RICO).
222. See, e.g., id. at 354 (setting forth the plaintiff s claim).
223. See, e.g., Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 23 F.
Supp. 2d 771, 777 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss civil conspiracy
and antitrust claims).
224. See, e.g., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir.
2000) (upholding dismissal of claims as too remote).
225. Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
226. See id. at 322 (denying defendant's motion to dismiss RICO and common law fraud
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Again, in each of these cases brought by health insurers, union trust funds,
hospitals, and the Manville Trust, the collective plaintiff sought to recover
damages for its own financial losses that resulted from tobacco-related diseases
suffered by thousands of victims, without any proof that the product of a
particular defendant caused harm to a particular victim.
B. Overcoming the Individual Causation Requirement in
Recoupment Actions
1. "Deceit and Fraud-A Continuing Conspiracy'"
27
States and other collective plaintiffs in recoupment actions against
manufacturers most often rely on a combination of the concert of action or civil
conspiracy theory for holding multiple defendants liable228 and substantive
claims based upon common law fraud229 or fraud-based statutory claims.23 ° For
example, the State of Ohio's complaint in the litigation that led to the tobacco
settlement alleged that the defendant manufacturers had manufactured,
promoted, and sold tobacco products both "while knowing, but denying and
concealing that their tobacco products caused injury and sickness ' 231 and while
enhancing the addictive properties of their products. The allegation that all this
was done while the defendants were "engaged in a conspiracy ' 232 enabled the
claims).
227. Complaint, State v. Am. Tobacco Co., Civil Action No. 95-1466AO (Fla. Cir. Ct.,
filed Feb. 21, 1995), at 84-85, available at Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra note 22.
228. See supra notes 195-202 and accompanying text (explaining civil conspiracy and
concert of action).
229. See supra note 214 (providing an example of a claim based on misrepresentation).
230. In the tobacco litigation, for example, many states included a claim based upon the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000), generally
referred to as "RICO." See supra note 216 (providing an example of a RICO based claim).
Enacted by Congress in 1970 as part of the Organized Crime Control Act, RICO prohibits
"enterprise criminality" which is defined broadly to include not only violence and corruption by
organized crime and violent gangs, but also "criminal fraud" by corporations. See generally
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). But see United States v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1198-1207 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (disallowing federal government claims
against tobacco manufacturers for disgorgement of profits).
The states' complaints in the tobacco litigation also included many claims based upon state
consumer protection acts. See, e.g., Complaint, People v. Philip Morris, Inc. (I11. Cir. Ct. 1996)
(alleging, in Count 3, violations of Illinois Unfair and Deceptive Acts or Practices Act),
available at Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra note 22.
231. Complaint, State ex rel. Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 315 249, at 21A (Ohio Ct.




state to hold the manufacturers jointly and severally liable. Similarly, the State
of New York alleged that the defendant manufacturers had conducted a
"[c]ampaign of [s]uppression, [d]eceit and [m]isrepresentations.
233
If an individual victim of tobacco-related disease or another disease
resulting from product exposure sues a manufacturer for misrepresentation, in
most cases she will need to prove that she exposed herself to the product in
reliance upon specific statements made by a specific manufacturer or by
defendants acting in concert with one another, and that her reliance resulted in
her tobacco-related disease.234 The requirement of reliance is obviously one
aspect of causation in misrepresentation cases. For example, in Lewis v. Lead
Industry Ass 'n235 the court denied the misrepresentation claims of the parents of
a lead-poisoned child because they could not allege that "they exposed their
children to lead-based paint in reliance upon any statement made by any of the
defendants, nor [did] they allege that the defendants' failure to disclose any fact
caused them to expose their children to lead-based paint., 236 In a handful of
mass product tort opinions, courts have expressed support for the idea of
"fraud-on-the-marketplace" that enables the plaintiff to recover for
misrepresentation without proving that she heard and relied upon a specific
false statement of the manufacturer, 237 but most courts reject the fraud-on-the-
marketplace concept in mass products torts.238
An individual victim of product-related disease, as a realistic matter, may
have an easier time proving reliance when the manufacturers' fraud consists of
failing to disclose information regarding the harmful effects of its products
233. Complaint, State v. Philip Morris, Inc., at 147A (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997), available at
Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra note 22.
234. See, e.g., Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 506, 517-24 (D.N.J. 2002)
(denying claim because victim could not prove reliance); Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 793
N.E.2d 869, 876 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (denying claim because victim's parents could prove
reliance neither on statements of defendants nor on their failure to disclose harmful nature of
product).
235. Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 793 N.E.2d 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
236. Id. at 876.
237. See, e.g., Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding that asbestos trust not need show reliance by specific claimants on statements made by
tobacco industry when "the vast unprecedented nature of the fraudulent scheme" resulted in
"detrimental reliance on this distorted knowledge by an intended and foreseeable class of
victims"); Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 831 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (accepting
plaintiff's "fraud on the market" theory).
238. See, e.g., Glassner v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 223 F. 3d 343,353 (6th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting fraud on the market theory while relying on Ohio law); Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
228 F. Supp. 2d 506, 518 (D.N.J. 2002) (rejecting fraud on the market theory while relying on
New Jersey law).
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when it is legally obligated to do so, either as a result of the manufacturers'
active suppression of information regarding the harmful effects of its
products239 or because the manufacturers' earlier partial statements were
misleading. In Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd.,240 for example, the Iowa Supreme
Court held that when manufacturers had made misleading statements to the
consuming public, even if the plaintiffs could not prove that they heard or
relied upon any particular statement, the manufacturers had a duty to disclose
sufficient information to the public generally to keep their earlier statements
from being misleading. 41 It is far easier, of course, for the individual plaintiff
to assert that he would have avoided exposure to a product if he had been
warned when that situation is merely a hypothetical one than it is to prove that
he in fact heard an affirmative misrepresentation and relied upon it to the
detriment of his health.
2. The Use of Statistical and Sampling Evidence
The state and other collective plaintiffs in recoupment actions do not
submit individualized proof establishing the harms experienced by each
particular resident with a product-related disease and the causal connection
between the particular victim and one or more specific manufacturers. Instead,
the collective plaintiff relies upon statistical and sampling evidence. For
example, in a state's lawsuit against tobacco manufacturers seeking
reimbursement of expenses caused by tobacco-related diseases, it must be
recognized that smoking does not cause all cases of lung cancer. Further, if the
collective plaintiffs underlying substantive claim is one based upon the
manufacturers' alleged misrepresentations, not all smokers would have avoided
smoking even if the manufacturers had not misrepresented, concealed, or failed
to disclose the risks of smoking. Yet it is unrealistic to expect-and
contemporary law does not always require-that the collective plaintiff must
prove that the cancer of each victim for whose medical expenses recovery is
sought was caused, in an objective, scientific sense, by tobacco products, or
that the victim would not have started smoking or would have stopped smoking
if the defendant-manufacturers had not misrepresented the risks of smoking.
239. See, e.g., Nicolett v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 150 (Del. 1987) (holding that when
manufacturers had conspired to suppress medical and scientific information regarding harmful
effects caused by exposure to their asbestos products, they had a duty to warn).
240. Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W. 2d 159 (Iowa 2002).
241. See id. at 175-76 (determining a manufacturer's duty to disclose).
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Statistical and sampling evidence enables the collective plaintiff in these
cases to prove, at least in the aggregate, the number of victims of tobacco-
related diseases whose diseases were caused by the misrepresentations of the
tobacco-companies, by determining the following:
a) the portion of the total number of cancer cases which were
caused by exposure to tobacco products and
b) the percentage of the victims of those tobacco-caused cancer
cases that would not have started smoking or would have
stopped smoking if the defendant-manufacturers had not
misrepresented the dangers of smoking.
Laurens Walker and John Monahan provide the following account from
the trial in the State of Minnesota's case against the tobacco companies of the
use of statistical methodology to establish the portion of the total number of
cancer cases caused by exposure to tobacco products:
The plaintiffs next called an expert in biostatistics ... [who] described a
model used to estimate the loss to the plaintiffs resulting from the alleged
misconduct of the defendants .... First, 280 million medical bills coded
with one or more of the thirteen smoking-related diseases and presented for
payment to the plaintiffs-the State of Minnesota or Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Minnesota-were summed. Then three reductions were made.
The first was intended to eliminate bills for patients not exposed to the
defendants' alleged misconduct because the patients were not smokers.
Since information about the smoking habits of the patients was not included
on the bills, a survey of a random sample of Minnesota residents was used
to determine the reduction necessary to eliminate disease and expense not
caused by smoking. The second reduction was intended to take into
account the fact that some of the smokers would have acquired one of the
thirteen diseases without smoking. The expert used epidemiological studies
to determine the percentage of patients who were smokers but who likely
would have contracted one of the thirteen diseases even if they had not
smoked.242
This testimony enabled the fact finder to determine the amount of damages
resulting from tobacco-related diseases. However, if the collective plaintiffs
substantive claim were based upon common law misrepresentation or fraud-
based statutory remedies, the amount still would be an over-inclusive figure
because it would include damages sustained by victims of tobacco-related
disease who would have started smoking and continued smoking even if the
defendant-manufacturers had not misrepresented the dangers of smoking. In In
242. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Liability, 85 VA. L. REv. 329,336-37
(1999).
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re Simon I Litigation,243 Judge Weinstein allowed experts specializing in
behavioral science and survey methodology to testify as to the rates of
smokers who would have quit smoking if the tobacco companies had not
misrepresented the risks. 244 The experts' testimony was premised on
telephonic surveys, a comprehensive review of empirical literature already
available on this issue, and a random sampling of the depositions of a
health insurer's subscribers.
245
The use of statistical and sampling evidence has allowed collective
plaintiffs to prove the amount of financial damages they have sustained as a
result of the increase in disease rates attributable to the use of the
manufacturer's products and the manufacturer's tortious conduct. The
harm proven is in the aggregate; it is not the result of summing the medical
expenses attributable to each individual victim. Put another way, the use of
statistical and sampling evidence is the method of proof that enables
recoupment actions to proceed on a collective, as opposed to a
particularistic, basis.
3. Torts Seeking Compensation for the Collective Harm: Public
Nuisance, Restitution, and Indemnity
State and municipal recoupment actions, as well as those brought by
health insurers, union health funds, and hospitals, also allege torts that
claim that the tortious harm was experienced directly by the collective
plaintiff and not by the individual victims who suffered from tobacco-
related disease or other product-related disease. These substantive claims,
historically not asserted in claims against product manufacturers, include
public nuisance, unjust enrichment and restitution, and indemnity
(indemnification). By using these legal theories, the state or other
collective plaintiff attempts to avoid the need to prove causation-that a
particular manufacturer caused a specific smoker's illness-as well as to
preclude the defendant's use of well established defenses based on a
smoker's own conduct such as contributory negligence and assumption of
risk. Many of the states' recoupment actions against tobacco manufacturers
246 .. 247included claims for public nuisance, unjust enrichment or restitution,
243. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
244. See id. at 127-29 (presenting the expert's testimony).
245. See id. (same).
246. See supra note 211 (providing examples).
247. See Complaint, Kelly ex rel. State. v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 96-8428 1-CZ (Mich.
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and indemnity. 248 Because these recoupment actions ultimately were settled,
courts never had a chance to determine the legal viability of the claims.249
Since the tobacco settlement, states and municipalities have continued to assert
claims based on public nuisance, unjust enrichment, and indemnity against




Until the tobacco recoupment actions filed in the mid-1990s, public
nuisance was typically regarded as "a species of catch-all low grade criminal
offense '252 or as "the great grab bag, the dust bin, of the law., 253 Public
nuisances included environmental harms such as the discharge of untreated
sewage, violations of public morals such as playing bingo for money or nude
Cir. Ct. Ingham County, filed Aug. 21, 1996) (demanding, in Count Three, restitution based
upon unjust enrichment), available at Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra note 22;
Complaint, State v. Philip Morris, Inc., (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (alleging, in Sixth Cause of
Action, unjust enrichment), available at Tobacco Litigation Documents, supra note 22;
Complaint, State ex rel. Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 315-249 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1997)
(demanding restitution based upon unjust enrichment in Count Four), available at Tobacco
Litigation Documents, supra note 22; see also supra note 212 (providing examples).
248. See supra note 213 (providing an example).
249. See McClendon v. Georgia Dep't ofCmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1254-55 (11th Cir.
2001) (describing terms of Master Settlement Agreement).
250. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 421 (3d Cir.
2002) (upholding trial court's dismissal of public nuisance claim); NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc.,
271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that "evidence presented at trial
demonstrated that defendants are responsible for the creation of a public nuisance," but
dismissing case because "[p]laintiff did not establish... that it suffered the special kind of harm
required to establish its private cause of action"); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d
98, 123 (Conn. 2001) (dismissing public nuisance and unjust enrichment claims on remoteness
grounds). But see City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1151 (Ohio
2002) (reversing dismissal of public nuisance claims against gun manufacturers).
251. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 130-31 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2005) (affirming dismissal of public nuisance claims against manufacturers of lead pigment);
City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 700 N.Y.S.2d 361, 364 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)
(dismissing indemnity and restitution claims). But see City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc.,
691 N.W.2d 888, 894 (Wis. App. Ct. 2004) (allowing public nuisance claims to proceed against
manufacturers of lead pigment or lead-based paint); State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., C.A. No.
990-5226, 2001 R.I. Super. LEXIS 37, at *19-28 (R.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 2, 2001) (denying,
partially, defendants' motion to dismiss).
252. William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 999
(1966).
253. Awad v. McColgan, 98 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Mich. 1959).
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exotic dancing, and even the playing of loud music and anti-abortion protests
that blocked access to abortion clinics.2 54
The tort of public nuisance lacked-and continues to lack-meaningful
definition and discernable boundaries.255 In a recent recoupment action brought
by the City of Chicago against handgun manufacturers, the Illinois Supreme
Court noted that public nuisance extends "'to virtually any form of annoyance
or inconvenience interfering with common public rights.', 256 Similarly, in
another recoupment action against gun manufacturers, the Ohio Supreme Court
began with the Restatement (Second) of Torts's language that defines public
nuisance as "'an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public,' ,257 acknowledging that the definition "is couched in broad
language.
258
In recoupment actions, state attorneys general and private counsel retained
by the states have taken advantage of the vagueness of the concept of public
nuisance, and the absence of meaningful parameters bounding liability, to
circumvent the requirements of more well-defined and mature bodies of law
governing products liability actions. 9 In particular, state recoupment actions
asserting public nuisance claims seek to eliminate any requirement that the state
or municipality prove that any specific manufacturer produced the products that
have caused any particular harm.
This elimination of the individual causation requirement in recoupment
litigation asserting public nuisance claims can result either from the substantive
definition of the public nuisance tort or from the handling of the causation
254. See Gifford, supra note 207, at 776 (asserting that a variety of fact patterns has
resulted in public nuisance claims).
255. See id. at 774-86 (defining the tort of public nuisance).
256. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1111 (11. Sup. Ct. 2004)
(quoting W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 86, at 618 (5th ed. 1984)).
257. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Ohio 2002)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821(B)(1) (1965)).
258. Id.; see also Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So. 2d 1029, 1036 (Fla. 2001) (stating that "a
public nuisance may be classified as something that causes any annoyance to the community or
harm to public health"); Gifford, supra note 207, at 774-75 (stating that "no other tort is as
vaguely described or poorly understood as public nuisance").
259. See Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d
536, 540 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that use of public nuisance in recoupment actions is patently
intended to circumvent "the boundary between the well-developed body of product liability law
and public nuisance law"); Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15 v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915,
921 (8th Cir. 1993) (employing public nuisance law in products cases threatens to allow public
nuisance to become "a monster that would devour in one gulp the entire law of tort"); see also
Gifford, supra note 207, at 834, 837 (stating that "[c]ourts should not replace the substantial
bodies of mature doctrinal and policy analysis"); see generally id. at 753-834.
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requirement, and often these issues blur. First, courts in recoupment litigation
sometimes have described a "public right," the interest protected by the public
nuisance tort, more broadly-and less accurately-than in the manner it has
been traditionally understood: as "an indivisible resource shared by the public
at large, like air, water, or public rights of way., 260 Instead, some courts in
recoupment cases have characterized a statewide or citywide accumulation of
private harms as a violation of the entitlement protected by the public nuisance
tort.2 61 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals recently accepted this rather dramatic
expansion of the public nuisance tort-in the process eliminating the individual
causation requirement linking the manufacturers' conduct with the harms
suffered by victims of childhood lead poisoning-when it allowed the City of
Milwaukee to proceed with its public nuisance claims against the manufacturers
of lead-based paint or lead pigment. That court ignored the alleged harms
failure to fall within the traditionally recognized boundaries for a public right:
The City has admitted that, because technology does not make it possible to
do so, the City cannot identify the specific lead pigment or paint contained
in the houses being abated. The City contends such identification is
unnecessary where, as here, it is a community-wide health threat which is
the alleged public nuisance, and the City can prove community-wide
marketing and sales by defendants in the City of Milwaukee at times
relevant to the creation of the nuisance ....
The City maintains that this position is consistent with the fact that public
nuisance is focused primarily on harm to the community or the general
public, as opposed to individuals who may have suffered specific personal
injury or specific property damage. We agree. Were it otherwise, the
concept of public nuisance would have no distinction from the theories
underlying class action litigation, which serves to provide individual
remedies for similar harms to large numbers of identifiable individuals.
262
Focusing on the causation requirements for a public nuisance action, a
Rhode Island trial court also recently interpreted the public nuisance tort very
broadly so as to eliminate any requirement of individual causation in that state's
recoupment action against manufacturers of lead pigment.263 The court rejected
the manufacturers' contention that the state was obligated to prove that the
manufacturers "are the proximate cause of the particular injury(ies) complained
260. City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., No. 1-03-326, 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 14, at *8
(Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 14, 2005) (rejecting city's claim).
261. See Gifford, supra note 207, at 814-19 (discussing interference with a public right).
262. City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Wis. App. Ct. 2004).
263. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, C.A. No. 99-5226,2004 R.I. Super LEXIS 191, at *7-
8 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2004) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss public nuisance claim).
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of.'264 The court acknowledged that individual causation was generally a
requirement of actions based on negligence or products liability law but held
that, in a public nuisance action, the defendants would be held jointly and
severally liable if it could be shown that they had participated in the
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.265
This same argument that government recoupment actions alleging public
arguments do not require proof of individual causation recently was explicitly
rejected by an Illinois appellate court in an action brought by the City of
Chicago against manufacturers of lead-based paint or lead pigment.266 The city
argued that because its claims were based on public nuisance, it was not
required to prove the identity of any manufacturer that caused any particular
harm.267 The court rejected the argument, finding that the theory "'would make
the manufacturers insurers of their industry ... and would result in an
abandonment of the principle that, to be held liable, a causative link must be
established between a specific defendant's tortious acts and the plaintiffs
injuries. ,268
264. See id. (noting that "the primary thrust of plaintiff's case here is its public nuisance
cause of action").
265. See id. (rejecting defendant's argument).
266. See City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(agreeing with the lower court "that plaintiff's amended complaint failed to sufficiently allege
proximate causation").
267. See id. at 135 (setting forth the government's argument).
268. See id. (quoting Lewis v. Lead Industries Ass'n, 793 N.E.2d 869, 875 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003)). In the city of Cincinnati's recoupment action against the manufacturers of handguns, the
Ohio Supreme Court ignored any possible requirement of individual causation. City of
Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Ohio 2002). The harms alleged by
the city were broadly and vaguely defined:
The city alleged that, as a result of the defendants' conduct in manufacturing or
distributing handguns, the city had suffered a host of problems, ranging from the
costs of responding to shootings to decreased property values and tax revenues, and
to Cincinnatians' general fears resulting from criminal activity and injuries caused
by firearms.
City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3601, CCH Prod. Liab. Rep.
P15880 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2000) rev'd, 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002). The Ohio
Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower courts' decisions to dismiss the claims, holding
that the allegation in the complaint that merely alleged that the fifteen defendants had directly
caused the harms was sufficient. See Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d at 1150-51 (noting that
reversal does not mean plaintiff will necessarily win on remand). The court found that the
damages were not too remote, finding persuasive factors such as the relative ease of proving the
amount of the city's expenditures for police and property repairs. Still, the court did not enter
into any discussion at all of the difficult "cause in fact" issues regarding whether a chain of
causation existed that would link any individual defendant to any victim of gun violence to the
city's expenditures as a result of such violence. See id. at 1149 (taking the allegations in the
complaint as true).
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The ultimate success or failure of the combination of the public nuisance
tort and government recoupment actions in overcoming the traditional
requirement of individual causation in mass products torts cases has yet to be
decided. Within the next few years, the state supreme courts of Illinois, New
Jersey,269 Rhode Island, and Wisconsin will render decisions that will go a long
way toward deciding this critical issue. Yet the reader of the recent opinions in
these government recoupment/public nuisance cases270 seldom escapes the
conclusion that well-intentioned judges, seeking judicial remedies to tragic
public health and public safety crises that the legislative and executive branches
have been unable or unwilling to effectively address, have dramatically
expanded the traditional, and perhaps better grounded, understanding of public
nuisance.
b. Unjust Enrichment and Indemnity
Unjust enrichment and indemnity have emerged alongside public nuisance
as poorly defined torts used by states and municipalities against product
manufacturers. In State v. Lead Industries Ass 'n,271 a Rhode Island trial court
More often in recoupment cases, courts have found the remoteness of the harms resulting
from the handgun manufacturer's conduct in creating a public nuisance to be fatal to the
government's claim. See Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
273 F.3d 536, 540-41 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing numerous examples); see also Ganim v. Smith &
Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 130-31 (Conn. 2001) (holding that the governmental plaintiffs
lacked standing to allege a claim of common-law public nuisance because the harms they
claimed were too remote from the defendant's misconduct and too derivative of the injuries of
others); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1138 (111. 2004) (holding
that defendants' actions were not a proximate cause of any harms caused by "the aggregate of
the criminal acts of many individuals over whom they have no control"). In Camden County
Board of Chosen Freeholders, the court reasoned:
The causal chain is simply too attenuated to attribute sufficient control to the
manufacturers to make out a public nuisance claim. In the initial steps, the
manufacturers produce lawful handguns and make lawful sales to federally licensed
gun distributors, who in turn lawfully sell those handguns to federally licensed
dealers. Further down the chain, independent third parties, over whom the
manufacturers have no control, divert handguns to unauthorized owners and
criminal use.
Camden County Bd of Chosen Freeholders, 273 F.3d at 541.
269. See In re Lead Paint Litig., No. A- 1 946-02T3, at 34 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., filed
Aug. 17, 2005) (reversing trial court dismissal of public nuisance claims brought by twenty-six
governmental entities against lead-paint manufacturers and distributors).
270. E.g., City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002); City
of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Lead Indus.
Ass'n, C.A. No. 99-5226, 2001 R.I. Super. LEXIS 37 (R.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 2, 2001).
271. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, C.A. No. 99-5226, 2001 R.I. Super. LEXIS 37 (R.I. Sup.
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denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the state of Rhode Island's unjust
enrichment claim against manufacturers of lead pigment seeking damages for
the state's expenses in addressing childhood lead poisoning.272 The court
quoted from an earlier Rhode Island Supreme Court opinion that stated that the
doctrine of unjust enrichment "permits the recovery in certain instances where a
person has received from another a benefit, the retention of which, would be
unjust under some legal principle, a situation which equity has established or
recognized. ',273 In order to recover, the state or other plaintiff must show that it
conferred a benefit upon the defendant that the defendant both appreciated and
accepted "in such circumstances that it would be inequitable for a defendant to
retain the benefit without paying the value thereof. 2 74 The Rhode Island trial
court found that the state's payment of the expenses caused by childhood lead
poisoning at a time when defendants continued to profit from the sale of lead
added to the defendants' benefit and therefore was sufficient to avoid a motion
to dismiss.
275
Most courts, however, have rejected unjust enrichment claims for injuries
generally regarded as tort injuries sounding in the more traditional theories of
strict products liability or negligence.2
76 In Perry v. American Tobacco Co.,
277
for example, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claims on the grounds that
defendant-tobacco companies had not been enriched "because Defendants [had]
no legal duty to smokers to pay their medical costs.
27 8
The trial court in the Rhode Island paint litigation also has denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss a separate claim based upon indemnity. 279 The
Ct. Apr. 2, 2001).
272. See id. at *50-51 (finding that the state's unjust enrichment claim survives a motion to
dismiss); see also NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d at 896-97 (rejecting defendant's motion for
summary judgment on restitution claim).
273. See Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Newport Hosp., 272 A.2d 329, 332 (R.I. 1971)
(asserting that unjust enrichment is not limited to circumstances in which there is a fraudulent
act).
274. See Lead Indus. Ass'n, 2001 R.I. Super. LEXIS 37, at *49 (quoting R & B Elec. Co.
v. Armco Constr. Co., 471 A.2d 1351, 1355 (R.I. 1984)).
275. See id. at *50-51 (taking the allegations in the complaint as true).
276. See, e.g., Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 324 F.3d 845, 857 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming
dismissal of unjust enrichment claims); Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund
v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 185 F.3d 957, 968 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); Steamfitters Local Union No.
420 Welfare Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 937 (3d Cir. 1999) (same).
277. Perry, 324 F.3d at 845.
278. See id. at 851 (affirming the dismissal of the complaint).
279. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, C.A. No. 99-5226, 2001 R.I. Super. LEXIS 37, at *53
(R.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 2, 2001) (stating that "the state has articulated the requisite elements for an
indemnity claim").
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court stated, "The concept of indemnity is 'based upon the theory that a party
who has been exposed to liability solely as a result of the wrongdoing of
another should be able to recover from the wrongdoer.' ,,280 In order to recover
on an indemnity theory, according to the court, the plaintiff must prove three
elements: "First, the party seeking indemnity must be liable to a third party.
Second, the prospective indemnitor must also be liable to the third party.
Third, as between the prospective indemnitee and indemnitor, the obligation
ought to be discharged by the indemnitor. ''28' The court upheld the state's
allegations that "as between the State and the defendants ... the defendants
ought to bear the burden of the lead-related expenditures resulting from the
damages due to the lead.
2 82
Again, most other courts have rejected the use of the indemnity theory of
recovery in what essentially is a tort claim brought by a state, municipality,
health insurer, or similar party.283 In rejecting such a claim, the court in
Allegheny General Hospital v. Phillip Morris, Inc.294 correctly noted that the
right of indemnity exists only when one party without active fault on its part is
legally obligated to pay damages caused by the actions of another party.285 For
example, an employer, faultless in its own right, generally is obligated to pay
for the torts committed by its employees within the scope of their employment
under the doctrine of vicarious liability. If the employer in fact pays the claim,
it has legal grounds to pursue (but probably will not) an indemnity claim
against the employee whose conduct was negligent or otherwise tortious. The
liability of the party who in fact pays, stated the court in Allegheny General
Hospital, must rest on fault that is imputed to the state or is constructively
imputed because of either some legal relationship between the parties or some
"positive rule" of statutory or common law.286
In the case of recoupment actions against product manufacturers, the state
is not legally obligated to make medical assistance payments to recipients as a
280. Id. at *51 (quoting McCrory v. Spigel, 740 A.2d 1274, 1276-77 (R.I. 1999)).
281. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 2001 R.I. Super. LEXIS 37, at *51 (quoting Muldowney v.
Weatherking Prods., Inc., 509 A.2d 441,442-43 (R.I. 1986)).
282. Id. at *53.
283. E.g., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 610, 622 (W.D.
Pa. 1999) (dismissing indemnity claim where plaintiffs were "neither vicariously nor
secondarily liable for any torts committed upon their Medicaid, medically indigent or non-
paying patients with tobacco-related diseases"); SEIU Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 70, 93 (D.D.C. 1999) (dismissing claim because plaintiffs had not alleged
that they were joint tortfeasors with defendants).
284. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 610 (W.D. Pa. 1999).
285. See id. at 621-22 (quoting Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 77 A.2d 368 (Pa. 1951).
286. See id. at 622 (same).
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result of the manufacturers' tortious conduct being imputed to the state. In
short, the indemnity claim adds nothing to a recoupment action unless the state
can show both (1) another basis of the legal obligation of the manufacturer to
reimburse the victims of product-related harms, and (2) a legal obligation that
the state pay for the product-related harms because of some relationship
between the state and the manufacturer.
4. Evaluating the Probable Success of Recoupment Actions in Overcoming
the Individual Causation Requirement
Recoupment actions brought by states and municipalities, when coupled
with substantive claims of either (1) fraud, committed by multiple defendants
acting in concert or as part of a civil conspiracy, or (2) one of the torts seeking
compensation for collective harm-public nuisance, unjust enrichment, or
indemnity-are the latest attempt to override or circumvent the traditional
requirement of individual causation in tort cases. Yet, even if government
recoupment actions are successful, they do not enable individual victims of
latent diseases and other injuries resulting from exposure to mass product torts
to recover from the manufacturers directly. The victims of such torts, those
suffering from tobacco-related disease, handgun violence, and childhood lead
poisoning, recover nothing from the manufacturers of the products.287 Only the
state or the municipality recovers directly.
In a sense, however, the state's payment of Medicaid proceeds to many of
the actual victims, when coupled with the recoupment action, acts much like an
alternative compensation system for the individual victims that limits
compensation to payment of specified medical expenses. Many victims of such
product-caused harms, however, are not Medicaid recipients and will recover
nothing. Further, neither the state nor any of its residents, whether Medicaid
recipients or not, recover damages for the lost income or the noneconomic
damages, such as pain and suffering, sustained by the actual victims of product-
related harms. Viewed from an instrumental perspective, these limitations on
recoverable damages reduce the manufacturers' incentives to minimize losses
below the socially efficient level.288
287. See, e.g., Floyd v. Thompson, 227 F.3d 1029, 1030-37 (7th Cir. 2000) (denying
claims of Medicaid recipients that they were entitled to a portion of the proceeds resulting from
the Master Settlement Agreement between the tobacco manufacturers and the states that had
settled after filing recoupment actions).
288. See THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 198-99, 222-23 (arguing that
restricting victims' recovery to economic losses would undermine the goal of primary accident
cost avoidance by alleviating the need for the injurer to consider the full consequences of its
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In order to circumvent the requirement of an individual causal link
between a particular manufacturer and an individual recipient of Medicaid
benefits suffering harm as the result of tobacco-related illness, handgun
violence, or childhood lead poisoning, the government must either prove fraud
committed by manufacturers acting in concert or through a civil conspiracy, or
rely upon novel and questionable interpretations of ancient concepts such as
public nuisance, unjust enrichment, or indemnity. No government yet has
recovered a judgment based upon any of these three mass products torts. It is
possible, perhaps likely, that government recoupment actions against
manufacturers provide a viable mechanism for overcoming the obstacles posed
by the traditional individual causation requirement only when it can be proved
that the manufacturers, acting in concert or as part of a civil conspiracy, have
committed fraud.
V. Conclusion
Modem scientific understanding informs us that, in a probabilistic or
actuarial sense, millions of people suffer from diseases resulting from exposure
to mass products and other toxic substances. Yet nearly a full generation after
courts first addressed the troubling causation problems inherent in cases
involving latent diseases and other harms resulting from exposure to fungible or
nearly fungible products manufactured by multiple defendants, the individual
causation requirement in tort-requiring the victim to prove that her specific
harm was caused by the products of a particular manufacturer-remains
remarkably resilient, denying compensation to the victims of such harms.
One might have expected a different outcome. Mass products torts seem
the perfect crucible in which to conduct a real world test of the plausibility of
the contrasting notions of causation inherent in the instrumental and corrective
justice theories of tort liability. Calabresi and others advocating an
instrumental conception of tort law find no justification for a requirement that
the victim prove that her harm was caused by a particular injurer. The
instrumental theory has profoundly influenced the development of other aspects
of products liability.289 But on the issue of the required causal connection, at
actions).
289. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963)
(justifying the adoption of strict products liability on the basis of loss minimization principles);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 83-84 (1960) (holding that implied
warranties extend to those not in privity with the seller on the basis of instrumentalist
principles).
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least, it appears that the result championed by Weinrib and other corrective
justice theorists is prevailing. The requirement of individual causation has had
remarkable staying power within the tort system.'
What is less clear, however, is the reasoning behind this continuing
judicial insistence on individual causation. One possibility, of course, is that
Weinrib is right and that courts accept his conclusion that the inherent
philosophical justification for tort liability requires a link between an individual
victim and an individual injurer.
There is, however, a second possibility. It may be that courts recoil from
assessing liability to a particular manufacturer whose acts cannot be shown to
have caused the plaintiff's harm because the whole notion seems both foreign
to the judicial function and one not easily handled by the courts. Involuntarily
taking funds from one group and transferring them to another group in the
absence of proof of individual causation, regardless of how persuasive the
victims' tragic illnesses may be, seems more like a taxation and welfare
function to be handled by legislative and administrative bodies than it does a
judicial function.
Further, if the plaintiff in a mass products case with indeterminate
manufacturers is to recover without proof of individual causation, sooner or
later the court must determine the respective share of the financial
responsibility for each of the defendant-manufacturers, either through market
share liability or during a subsequent contribution action among
manufacturers.29 ° Yet only in a few cases, such as those involving DES, is it
possible to apportion realistically causal responsibility in a manner that satisfies
typical notions of fairness and accuracy within the judicial process. Framed as
an issue of institutional competence and appropriate institutional boundaries,
disquietude about recovery in the absence of proof of individual causation is
fully compatible with an instrumental theory of tort law.
In the absence of proof of an individual causal connection, compensation
for harms caused by exposure to mass products torts is better left to alternative
compensation systems than to courts.291 In these venues, we can dispense with
any requirement of individual causation: determinations of which claimants
may recover, and which manufacturers must pay and in what amounts, would
be left to the legislative branch and administrative agencies. Today's scholars,
290. See Donald G. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed By Latent Diseases Resulting
From Mass Products, 64 MD. L. REV. 613 (2005) (noting that any contribution system that
provides for collective responsibility must address the division of financial responsibility).
291. See id. at 619-20 (stating that the current system fails to accomplish Calabresi's three
goals of reducing accident costs); see generally Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy
of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REv. 951 (1993).
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judges, and mass products torts attorneys, intellectual heirs of the 1960S292
whose conception of torts has been shaped by the instrumental theory, expect
too much from the judicial system.
292. See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 41.

